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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of information technology is constantly growing but carrying out information 
system projects has proven to be very difficult in Finland. Especially projects within the 
public healthcare have been unsuccessful. Finland is one of the leading IT countries in 
the world but facing many challenges in retaining its position. 
 
The aim of the research was to find out the reasons behind the massive health care 
information system project failures that have occurred in Finland during the past years. 
The empirical material was a sample if news articles on the topic. The information was 
then deepened with related literature, which discussed, for instance, information 
systems procurement, and features related to especially health care information system 
projects. 
 
A coherent strategy both for the state’s overall IT operations and for the development of 
HCIS, and good knowledge in information systems procurement play important roles in 
the success of the projects. By having good knowledge in project procurement, public 
buyers will be able to divide projects into smaller parts and to reduce their dependency 
on the vendors. Managing the project after the procurement is actually a relatively small 
part, if the two foundation parts are in order. End-user participation and proper 
monitoring and evaluation are essential during the entire project. 
 
In the future, the emphasis should be on successful examples instead of constantly 
focusing on negative outcomes. The media should not indulge in exaggeration. 
Cooperation between the buyers and vendors, between different buying organizations, 
and within the buying organizations should be enhanced. 
 ______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Health care information systems, information systems, IT project 
management, public information system projects 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
There are quite many infamous examples of Finnish IT project management from the 
recent years. Many public information system projects have failed to meet their 
objectives; the projects have exceeded in time and costs, the implementations have 
caused problems, and the results have remained limited. We have all seen the headlines 
screaming the expensiveness of Apotti, suffered from the failed implementation of VR’s 
new ticket system in 2011, and read about the failed electronic voting. Actually, I 
myself voted twice in the 2008 municipal elections, since the system lost some of the 
votes on the first time.   
 
Especially projects within the public healthcare have been unsuccessful. There are 
probably many, failed private IT projects as well, but they can be hidden from the 
public more easily. Instead, failures in public projects are fair game for the media: 
media is horrified of the big budgets and exceeded schedules. Same factors are 
constantly pointed out as reasons for the failures: poor management, buyers’ lack of 
expertise, oligopoly of vendors, and so on. 
 
I was interested in the topic even before I started at the University of Vaasa in 2012. I 
worked as project manager in several small information system projects and kept 
wondering, why the public sector wasn’t able to succeed in one single project after so 
many failures. Nobody seemed to be able to learn from previous mistakes. Then again, I 
pondered whether the media was just overreacting and trying to find scandalous 
headlines. There are many similar failures in the construction industry, too, but they 
have not been discussed in the publicity in a similar way.  
 
In this research, I study some of the major Finnish health care system projects, which 
have somehow failed to accomplish the goals that were set for them. I try to indicate 
how the outcomes differed from the original plans and to point out the possible reasons 
behind the distinction. Also, I try to find out what could be developed in the future, in 
order to get better results.  
 
1.1 Generic background 
 
The role of information technology is constantly growing, even for those companies – 
or for that matter, states – the core business of which is not related to IT. Benefiting 
from information technology requires big investments but can result in major savings, 
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too. Though, profiting from IT investments is not self-evidence, as has been seen in 
Finland. Carrying out information system projects has proven to be extremely difficult, 
for some reason. The amount of money does not alone determine the success of an IT 
project, rather than how the projects are managed. (Kouhi 2013: 7-9.) 
 
Finland is often compared to Estonia, which is a success story and textbook example of 
how a state’s information systems should be developed. Estonia has a consistent 
strategy, according to which it develops itself towards being an information society. At 
the same time with Estonian citizens using electronic ID for identifying themselves and 
performing all of their formal transactions online, Finland has failed in the electronic 
identification card, several citizen portals, such as Suomi.fi and Asiointitili, the 
electronic voting, license register of the Police, and so on. (e.g. Estonian Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Communications 2006; LL 10.8.2012; TE 14.8.2012; HS 
29.11.2013a-c.) 
 
There are positive examples, too, but for some reason only the failures are emphasized 
in the public discussion. For instance, in the early 00’s, the Ministry of Justice 
succeeded in renewing the entire election system of Finland quickly and economically, 
and the quality of the system was good. Even the Ministry of Social Affairs and health, 
a facet that has recently faced a lot of criticism, has succeeded in delivering an 
occupational health related system around year 2010. (Forselius 2013: 9.) 
 
Media has played a big role in the discussion becoming so frantic. It is constantly 
comparing Finland to Estonia, even though many specialists say that it is not reasonable, 
due to the different backgrounds of the two countries (e.g. TE 22.5.2013; HS 24.9.2012; 
HS 10.9.2012; YLE 20.9.2012). It is interesting to compare the reportage of 
construction projects, since they have traditionally suffered from similar problems. For 
instance, the completing of Länsi-Metro has been delayed several times and will 
significantly exceed its original budget (HS 10.2.2014) but it has not raised a similar 
discussion. 
 
So, why is it important to study this matter? At this point, the public discussion has 
become very one-sided and accusing. There is a lack of co-operation within the public 
buying organizations, and also between the buying organizations and vendors (e.g. TE 
2.10.2011; HS 14.10.2012). As already mentioned, the role of information technology is 
constantly growing and Finland has to keep up with the pace. Even though Finland is 
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one of the leading IT countries in the world (YLE 20.9.2012), we have to resolve many 
issues related to the scatteredness and age of the systems (TE 9.10.2009; HS 24.9.2012).  
 
In Australia, the state of Victoria – being of the same size as Finland – succeeded in 
halving its IT budget between 1996 and 2002 (Forselius 2013: 9). By developing the 
state’s IT strategy and improving the knowledge in information systems project 
management, it is very much possible for Finland to achieve similar savings. We are on 
the right track: the current problems have been noticed and admitted, and there are 
projects that aim at developing the situation. For instance, the Ministry of Finance 
started a program for developing the evaluation of information system projects 
(Ministry of Finance 2010). 
 
1.2 Aim and limitations of the study  
 
The aim of the research is to find out the reasons behind the massive health care 
information system project failures that have occurred in Finland during the past years. 
The intention is clarify how it is possible that public IT projects keep being delayed by 
several years, exceed their costs multiple times, and result in systems that do not fulfill 
the need of the end users, and that cannot be developed further. The hypothesis is that 
there must be a lack of knowledge in one or several fields of project management. In the 
conclusions, I will hopefully be able to partly answer on how the failures could be 
prevented the next time. Before that, the study will be steered by the following 
questions: 
 
 How did the researched health care information system projects not meet their 
objectives? 
 What are the possible reasons behind the failures? 
 
The empirical material was limited to only include health care information system 
projects due to the huge amount of information available on all sorts of failed 
information system projects. Still, due to the generalizing nature of the study, the results 
can be utilized for all public information system projects. The study does not aim at 
providing very specific solutions – it is not possible due to the empirical material – but 
at pointing out the most problematic factors and fields. Concentrating on and 
developing the skills within them is crucial for succeeding in similar projects in the 
future. 
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1.3 Research method and reliability 
 
This research is a qualitative research, in which the method was to use public 
documents to collect the needed empirical material. The research was conducted by 
collecting a sample of news articles in three Finnish news media: Helsingin Sanomat, 
YLE, and Talouselämä. A couple of other articles were also used, since they were 
linked to the ones found on these pages. Different keywords, such as information 
system (tietojärjestelmä) and names of the different projects, were used to find the 
articles. Often, the articles were linked to several other articles on the same subject, 
which helped to find more information.  
 
All in all, 94 news articles were used in the empirical part of this Thesis. The number of 
articles was limited to year 2013 and before, since it would have been difficult to write 
the Thesis simultaneously with the situation changing all the time. The changes were 
taken into account in the conclusions. Also, in case of ePrescription, there was a lot of 
regional news available on Yle.fi, so not all of it was used. For instance, there was a 
new article each time the system was implemented in a new municipality. 
 
The articles were then divided by project and organized by publishing date. Articles that 
did not have to do with a certain project, but with the general situation, formed their 
own entity. Also, there were several articles that dealt with more than one of the 
projects. All articles were read through in order to form a big picture of the situation. 
Then, different methods were used to analyze the information; notes, mind maps, 
timelines.  
 
There are many issues related to evaluating the reliability of a qualitative research, 
objectivity being one of the most important ones (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 134). In this 
particular research, major issues were related to the quality of the empirical material. 
Using only public documents for the empirical part would give very limited and shallow 
results. Therefore, the study was conducted so that the empirical material was dealt with 
before the theoretical part. The idea was to study the news articles to find the most 
obvious reasons for failure – after all, they have been quite thoroughly discussed in the 
media – and to then compare the findings with theory, in order to dig deeper into the 
problems and to maybe find new points of view.  
 
Also, the size of the sample is always an important aspect when determining the 
reliability of a study (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 85). In this research, saturation was the 
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main criterion for determining the adequate sample size. Saturation refers to a situation 
where the material starts to repeat itself, in other words, adding more material will not 
result in any additional value (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 87). All three news media 
provided pretty much with the same information – and it also started to repeat itself at a 
very early stage – so including other sources of information or more articles from the 
existing ones was not considered essential. 
 
In general, the Finnish news media can be considered reliable but reading such a big 
amount of articles related to one single topic revealed a surprising amount of 
preferences and carelessness. Objectivity of the researcher is one key component in 
research reliability (Tuomi & Sarajärvi 2009: 140) so it was important to examine both 
the sources and information critically. For instance, Helsingin Sanomat provided several 
opinion pieces from their editors, such as the article on Espoo doing the right decision 
when withdrawing from Apotti (HS 23.1.2013). Also, the projects and especially their 
budgets were often mixed with each other in the media, mainly in Talouselämä (TE 
1.11.2009; TE 14.8.2012). The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health even organized a 
press conference concerning the mix-ups (HS 22.9.2012a). 
 
This Thesis aims at finding new, objective points of view to a widely discussed subject 
that is not always examined in a very objective way. The goal is not to find a specific 
theoretical model for health care information systems project management – that is, in 
my opinion, impossible – but to dig deeper into the subject in order to find issues that 
should be more carefully considered in the future. The research method and its level of 
reliability support this aim. 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The Thesis consists of four chapters: introduction, empirical data, theory, and 
conclusions. The introduction explains the main purposes and background of the study, 
and introduces the research questions. Research methods and evaluation of the 
reliability are also discussed in the introduction. The second chapter presents the 
empirical data, in other words the information collected and summarized from the news 
articles. Further hypothesis, based on which the theory was chosen, is also presented. 
After that, the theoretical part discusses some related literature, such as information 
system procurement, and special features that are related to health care information 
system projects. The last chapter summarizes the study, and makes conclusions and 
suggestions for the future.        
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1.5 Terms and abbreviations 
 
The scientific articles that were used in the theoretical part of this Thesis all focused on 
slightly different sorts of health care information systems. Still, the main idea in all of 
the information systems – whether they are called hospital information systems, patient 
care information systems etc. – is that they provide patient data information cross-
organizationally. So, health care information system (HCIS) is used as a superordinate 
term for all of the different systems. List of abbreviations is provided before.  
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2 EMPIRICAL DATA 
The empirical part of the Thesis is divided into six parts. The first one describes the 
general situation in Finland, when it comes to public use of information systems and 
related projects. The second one focuses on health care information systems. The 
following three subchapters all deal with certain projects: Kanta, ePrescription, and 
Apotti. The last subchapter summarizes the empirical part.  
 
2.1 Generic situation of public Finnish IT (project) management 
 
Foundations for developing new information systems in Finland are not in order (HS 
24.9.2012). According to one estimate, there are 7 000 different information systems in 
the Finnish public administration, and these systems work very poorly with each other 
(TE 9.10.2009). The government has stated that the situation already is a problem for 
productivity and hindering the development of new systems (HS 17.9.2013). Still, 
according to many international studies and national experts, Finland is one of the 
leading IT countries in the world (YLE 20.9.2012).  
 
Public IT projects cost yearly hundreds of millions of euros (HS 26.3.2013). Finland 
uses the second most money on electronic public services in Europe, with respect to the 
GNP. Finland invests 3 percent of its GNP into these services. Estonia seems to get 
better results with less money. Jani Ekman from Cap Gemini Consulting says that 
Finland is a forerunner but its systems are old and not easily transformed into modern 
days. (HS 29.5.2013.) Often, there seems to be a will to build new systems instead of 
integrating the old ones (TE 9.10.2009). 
 
In Finland, big public sector IT projects have failed and, almost without exception, 
resulted in chaos (TE 2.10.2011; HS 26.3.2013; TE 30.1.2013). Projects are poorly 
managed, inefficient and the same vendors are used time after time. They fail because of 
bad leadership and unprofessional vendors (HS 26.3.2013). There is simply not enough 
knowledge to manage the projects. In addition, the monitoring is insufficient and there 
are not enough resources for the project in general (HS 7.9.2013). Results have mostly 
remained regional. Poor coordinating has led to several small and overlapping projects 
(YLE 10.1.2012a). 
 
Professor Matti Rossi from Aalto University says that one major problem in Finland is 
that all problems are tried to be solved at once. Projects are so slow that the world 
18 
 
changes during them (YLE 20.9.2012; TE 2.10.2011). According to the National Audit 
Office, the heart of the problem is, that “the state’s IT operations are led by no one”. A 
leading inspector at the office, Tomi Voutilainen, says that the state’s IT units just 
“potter around” with things by themselves and keep overlapping each other’s projects. 
They have new strategies before old projects have even been implemented, and it seems 
like they implement new projects just to cover up old mistakes. (TE 15.12.2008.)  
Mistakes should always be documented and learnt from in general, not just inside the 
organization. Failures are not discussed in public. It should not be a shame to abort an 
unsuccessful project. (HS 7.9.2013.) 
 
In the public administration, IT operations are scattered between 50 different operators 
in different ministries, institutions, and departments. Therefore, the state is going to put 
up its own IT company to merge all the operations into one financial unit. Timo Valli, 
Director of Public Government IT, says that this will result in savings of at least 60 
million euros pro year.  The company will be in action in 2014. (HS 22.9.2012b; TE 
7.11.2013.) Half of the state’s ICT costs come from purchased services and a third from 
personnel costs. The new company will have 1 000 employees and an annual turnover 
of 300 million euros, which will make it one of the five biggest operators in Finland. 
The company will sell its services to the state without them having to be tendered. (HS 
22.9.2012b.) 
 
It is important to ask the end users, what services they would want to use and why. 
After all, what determines the success of an information system is whether people will 
start using it or not (TE 9.10.2009). According to a study, 41 percent of Finnish people 
do not use electronic public services – and this figure does not include people who do 
not use Internet at all. Biggest reason for not using the services is that some of them 
require traditional paper work in addition to the electronic service (HS 29.5.2013). In 
many municipalities, an electronic service still means that you can only print out a form 
online (HS 29.11.2013c). 
 
2.1.1 Vendors and contracts 
 
One factor that is pointed out as a big problem is the so-called vendor or contract trap. It 
is beneficial for vendors to try to tie the customer to the contract and to their services 
(HS 7.9.2013). Buyers know that the vendors will try to gain as much monetary benefits 
as they can, but they do not have enough know-how to stand up for themselves. On the 
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other hand, vendors are aware of buyers not having enough knowledge and are willing 
to take advantage of the situation (HS 14.10.12).  
 
Even if the National Audit Office’s reports show the mistakes clearly, the same vendors 
are used project after project (TE 2.10.2011). The bids are often organized so that only a 
few big vendors can take part in them. Then the chosen vendor can charge huge 
amounts for changes in the system, since the interfaces are not open for anyone else to 
develop. When outlining the contract, you always need to consider who owns the data 
and the coding, says PhD in Economics Maria Alaranta. (HS 7.9.2013.) Future needs 
have to be put into the contract in order to avoid costly changes afterwards. (HS 
14.10.2012.) 
 
New ways to execute projects need to be found in co-operation with the private sector. 
Communications between the vendor and the buyer is important. Splitting the projects 
and contracts into smaller parts may be one solution. Also, there is need for more 
skillful officials. (HS 17.9.2013.) Many facets keep highlighting the importance of open 
interfaces. They will help prevent unfair contracts and make it easier for smaller 
vendors to compete in the market (TE 9.10.2009; HS 7.9.2013). 
 
2.1.2 Legislative issues 
 
There has been a lot of discussion on different laws and regulations slowing down the 
development of public information systems and processes related to them. For instance, 
in 2008 the Ministry of Traffic and Communications started to plan a law concerning 
electronic identification. This law did not take into account that the systems in use for 
electronic identification are necessarily not the same in the future – we use mobile 
banking accounts now but it is possible that a better system emerges at some point. Also, 
laws, regulations and, thus, also finished IT systems are often blamed for only taking 
the public sector into account. (TE 15.12.2008; TE 9.10.2009.) 
 
The Public Procurement Act was regulated in 2007 and it is claimed to be the reason for 
the vendors’ dominant role in the market. The act determines how to buy things that are 
financed with tax money. Mostly, the procedure is open, which means that politicians 
and officials decide what they want, ask for bids and then accept the lowest offer. The 
procedure does not work when the purchased object is an information system. Few 
municipalities have enough knowledge to determine all needed features in advance. 
This results in poor contracts and costly changes. (HS 14.10.2012.) 
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Also, boundaries in authority between different public facets cause problems.  Of course, 
since there are 7 000 different, poorly integrated information systems in the Finnish 
public administration, certain standards need to be placed (TE 15.12.2008; TE 
9.10.2009). Voluntariness does not necessary work so the Data Administration Act 
allows state operators to be forced into using a certain system (HS 29.11.2013c).  
 
2.2 Generic situation of health care systems 
 
Even though Finland is among the leading countries in the world in IT, the situation in 
health care systems is not as good. Finland has not had a clear insight on where it is 
going and as a result, we have an expensive and scattered “system of systems” that is 
very inefficient. Even though renewing the systems is expensive, it is even more 
expensive to do nothing. (HS 24.1.2013; HS 26.8.2013.) Social and health care cover 
almost half of the expenses of municipalities (TE 9.10.2009).  
 
Like all public IT projects, health care projects are criticized for being expensive, and 
delayed, and the results being limited (TE 4.2.2011; HS 15.5.2012). A report made by 
the National Audit Office shows, that the monitoring for developing information 
systems for public health care is not sufficient. Unsuitable systems can end up in use, 
because no one is monitoring the operations logic of the systems (TE 2.10.2011). 
 
The Finnish Funding Agency for Innovation, Tekes, has issued grants for social and 
health care IT projects. There was a scandal, when the National Audit Office stated that 
these grants had not been monitored sufficiently. Some of the grants hade been directed 
to big IT vendors, which caused disruption in the market. (YLE 10.1.2012a; HS 
26.3.2013; HS 7.9.2013; HS 29.11.2013c.) Also, HL7, which is an association created 
for developing health care IT system implementations, had prepared several projects 
among insiders, and without caring for the disqualification (HS 29.11.2013c). 
 
First, the public administration finances the software development and then, after the 
software is finished, pays for it again. It is not acceptable use of public assets and can be 
considered abuse of dominant position in the market, says the leading inspector of NAO, 
Tomi Voutilainen. These vendors have blocked the market from new products and 
smaller vendors and slowed down the integration of the many different systems. (YLE 
10.1.2012a.) NAO states that during years from 2000 to 2008, more than 10-15 million 
euros has been wasted. In addition, municipalities finance half of these projects on their 
own, so the actual sum is double. NAO found that the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
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Health and Tekes have even acted against the law. They were believed guilty of 
transgression in direct procurement and grant decision-making. The grants could be 
collected back. (YLE 10.1.2012b.) 
 
Both the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and Tekes claimed that the critic was 
unnecessary: there was no illegibility in their projects and they had already corrected 
many obscurities in their internal audits. MSAH also claimed, that they have gotten 
national results in their projects. Tekes admitted, that the results have remained regional. 
(YLE 10.1.2012a; HS 21.8.2013a.) 
 
The National Bureau of Investigation even started an investigation concerning the 
actions of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The ministry is supposed to ensure 
that the patient data systems bought by municipalities and health care districts work 
together, and was now suspected to have neglected the monitoring. (HS 21.8.2013a.) 
Later, the investigation was closed since the suspected crimes were either too old to be 
prosecuted anymore or very minor (HS 29.11.2013). 
 
2.2.1 Situation in other countries 
 
There has been a lot of discussion and debate on how different systems and processes 
work in Estonia. Estonia has never had its own big IT companies, so they have been free 
to choose their vendors (HS 24.9.2012). They have also started from a scratch without 
the burden of old systems (HS 29.5.2013). Estonians name the decision making process 
as one of their strengths. Necessary laws have been changed to support electronic 
services. 65 percent of the population use public e-services, and the identification for 
the services can be done even with a mobile phone. (LL 10.8.2012; TE 14.8.2012.) 
 
In Estonia, vendors have not gotten such a dominant position as in Finland. Taavi 
Einaste, who is the eHealth-director of the system vendor Nortal, says that there are a 
lot fewer different health care systems in Estonia than what there are in Finland. The 
Finnish-Estonian company is interested in getting more assignments in Finland, and 
maybe even participating in the tendering of Apotti, the new patient data system for the 
Hospital District of Helsinki and Uusimaa (HUS). Nortal’s predecessor CCC has 
previously developed patient care systems for University Central Hospitals in Finland. 
(LL 10.8.2012; TE 14.8.2012.) Estonia has a general strategy behind all of its public 
and private IT operations: the country aims at creating services that can be used as 
examples for the entire Europe (HS 17.9.2013). 
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Denmark is often considered a forerunner, too. The country has created a well-working 
portal for its citizens. The idea is to provide a platform where both public and private 
operators can offer their services all in one place. Canada has a similar project called 
Service Canada, which aims at collecting all the social and health services into one 
place. (TE 9.10.2009.) Denmark tried to build a similar patient data systems like the 
Finnish Apotti but the project was aborted after a failed pilot phase (HS 7.9.2013). 
 
2.2.2 Current patient data systems 
 
As much as half of the working time of health center physicians in Helsinki go to using 
different computer systems, and a lot of that time is wasted. When a physician logs in to 
the computer, he or she has to open four different systems. In case of being on-call in a 
hospital, the number increases by two. Then there is the new ePrescription system. 
Using the health care information systems is not easy, says Associate Chief Physician 
Timo Lukkarinen. (HS 16.7.2012a.) Poorly integrated systems are not that much of a 
risk to the patients, but a slow-down for the physicians’ daily work (HS 16.7.2012b). 
 
A study made by The Finnish Medical Association shows that physicians harshly 
criticize the current systems. The chairwoman of the association’s eHealth team, Tiina 
Lääveri, reckons that one reason behind the criticism is the fact that programmers do not 
understand how the systems are going to be used in the future. On the other hand, it is 
hard for the end-users to explain that to the programmers. (HS 16.7.2012b.) 
 
Logica’s Pegasos-system has been criticized for being too stiff. The user interface 
cannot be modified and there has to be 3-4 other systems simultaneously open. The 
logic behind the system is not clear and often there are too many possible ways to 
proceed, says Chief Physician of Töölö Health Center Mikko Valkonen. Physicians also 
wish that the system would compile statistics automatically. The systems have not been 
able to keep up with the legislation and statistical requirements. Lääveri even thinks that 
systems could and should be intelligent enough to prevent human mistakes, such as 
prescribing drugs with hazardous synergistic effects, from happening, and to guide 
physicians in decision-making. (HS 16.7.2012a; HS 16.7.2012b.) 
 
The development of the widely used patient data system began in the late 90’s. In 
Helsinki, Pegasos was put to use in 2002, and later in many other municipalities, too. 
Logica claims that the system has been constantly developed further. Janne Romo, IT 
Manager at the Töölö Health Center, believes that the vendors have not been interested 
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in developing the systems, because market in Finland is so small and the are few 
vendors to choose from. (HS 16.7.2012a.)  
 
Luckily, there are positive examples, too. In Central Finland, the work of emergency 
duty physicians became 10 percent more efficient when the 15 information systems that 
were used in the region were merged. Romo and Lukkarinen are positive about the new 
Apotti-system, which will replace the old systems used in Helsinki. Lukkarinen hopes 
for Apotti to include such information as the patient’s dental and special health care 
history, and also social care history. The medical history of a patient in different 
organizations could then be combined with the permission of the patient. This would 
help especially when taking care of the elderly and comorbidity. (HS 16.7.2012a; HS 
16.7.2012b.) 
 
2.2.3 Other related systems 
 
As said, there is a huge amount of different public information systems in Finland. The 
communications between these systems needs to be developed, so new solutions for 
data transfer need to be come up with. Another big issue is the identification. In order to 
use electronic systems, you need to be identified somehow. Developing health care 
systems requires development of other, related systems, too. (TE 15.12.2008; HS 
14.10.2012.) 
 
Electronic ID card is an electronic identification system that is maintained by the 
Population Register Centre. The card enables a secure online identification (TE 
15.12.2008). An electronic ID card was developed in Finland already in 1999 – as the 
first country in the world – but the implementation failed, since different officials kept 
fighting with each other about the winning technology. The system cost 40 million 
euros and is used by practically no one (HS 14.10.2012). In Estonia, the electronic ID 
card has been the foundation for all information systems. The card became obligatory 
for each citizen in 2002 and now they can, among other things, vote, use Internet 
banking and sign loan papers online (HS 24.9.2012). The reader is a smaller device that 
costs around 10 euros (HS 29.11.2013). 
 
Estonia will also help Finland to create a service, where citizens have access to all 
registers that contain information about them, such as population register and property 
register. Estonia already has such a service and will provide Finland with the open 
source code. The solution is called X-Road and it enables a secure and efficient transfer 
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of data between different organizations, both public and private. At the same time, 
citizens get a web portal, where they can access all their information at once. X-Road is 
a back office solution that will enable services that are more efficient and have a better 
quality. The system has already been tested in Espoo. (HS 17.9.2013; HS 29.11.2013c.) 
 
All old and new services in Finland could be integrated with X-Road. Citizens could 
find and look at information in one place. It would also benefit officials, since they 
could search for information at its original source without having to save it to their own 
server. Jari Porrasmaa, specialist at Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, thinks that it 
is useless to start importing patient data to the X-Road, since the Kanta system has just 
been built, and Apotti will be integrated with Kanta. Still, he thinks that the X-Road 
could be used for appointment making, and maybe parents could see their children’s 
electronic prescriptions, which is not possible in Kanta. (HS 29.11.2013c.) 
 
2.3 Kanta 
 
Kanta is an electronic repository for patient data: it is a central patient data archive for 
municipalities, private practices, and central hospitals. Patient data information will be 
transferred in a standardized form so that it can be searched and examined beyond 
organizational borders. Pharmacy systems and all the different patient data systems in 
Finland will be integrated with Kanta. (TE 1.11.2009; HS 22.9.2012a.) In the future, if a 
municipality wants to change patient data systems, it can store all information in Kanta, 
and then transfer and save it to the new system later on. An IT vendor does not have to 
be included in the process, so monetary savings will be achieved. The system uses an 
open interface. (HS 7.9.2013.) 
 
The planning of a system like Kanta started already in the 90’s. The original idea was to 
boost the efficiency of public health care by improving the communications between 
different operators, and to improve drug and patient safety. Physicians would be able to 
see all the drugs prescribed to a patient and be able to evaluate the synergistic effects of 
them. (YLE 8.10.2009; YLE 10.11.2009.) The actual Kanta project was started in 2003 
(HS 14.10.2012).  
 
The Kanta entity consists of four parts: eArchive, ePrescription, pharmacy database and 
the eHealth Portal, a web portal for citizens to access their personal health care 
information (TE 1.11.2009). The first part of Kanta to be developed is the ePrescription, 
and second is the eArchive (HS 29.5.2013). The eArchive is supposed to be 
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implemented in September 2014 and every health care operator – no matter public or 
private – should be in the system in autumn 2015. Sticking to the schedule is important 
also because people now have the legal right to choose where they are treated (HS 
15.5.2012). The eHealth Portal will be launched at the same time with the first 
ePrescriptions. The identification will happen with the electronic ID card or with mobile 
banking login (YLE 10.11.2009).  
 
The project will have an effect on both primary and special health care, pharmacies, 
health care organizations, several vendors, and all citizens (TE 1.11.2009). Since being 
able to see their own medical history in Kanta, patients are hoped to become more 
interested in their own health and to take more responsibility for it. Though, Maritta 
Korhonen, Development Manager at National Institute for Health and Welfare, fears 
that it may also increase patients’ eagerness to make their own diagnosis. Therefore, the 
system will include links to reliable sources of information. (HS 29.5.2013.) 
 
Kanta is also supposed to decrease drug misuse, since people are not able to get the 
same prescription from different physicians anymore. Also, it can be seen, which 
physicians describe noticeable amounts of certain drugs. (HS 29.5.2013.) Although 
patients are able to make limitations to who can to see their information – for instance, 
they can block occupational health care visits from the system – while testing the 
system in Eastern Savo and Northern Carelia, less than one percent of the 150 000 
patients made such limitations. (HS 29.5.2013.) 
 
Kanta is estimated to cost 400-500 million euros (TE 14.8.2012). When the system is 
put to use, license fees from the users are used to finance it (HS 10.8.2013). The 
organization responsible for the system is the Ministry of Social Issues and Health (HS 
22.9.2012a). Other facets that participate in the development are Kela, the social 
security institution in Finland, and the National Institute for Health and Welfare (HS 
10.8.2012). 
 
2.3.1 Project progression and issues 
 
Kanta project has had problems with financing, schedules, incoherent management, and 
lack of resources (HS 10.8.2013). There have been many technical problems and, once 
again, the many existing information systems have not interacted with each other (YLE 
8.10.2009). The specifications of eArchive and ePrescription were made by different 
vendors (TE 2.10.2011). Many people say that, once again, the problem in the project 
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has been the pursuit of perfection. First, the idea was to develop the patient transactions 
on local, municipal level but the plans soon escalated to health districts, and then to the 
entire country. The project became way too ambitious. Implementing a national system 
requires hundreds of decisions within both the public and the private sector. (YLE 
8.10.2009.)  
 
The Act on the Electronic Processing of Client Data in Social and Health Care and the 
Act on Electronic Prescriptions became valid already in 2007. A transition time of 
several years – until spring 2011 – was given but the schedule had to be re-estimated 
since the Kanta project was well delayed. In September 2009, a new schedule was 
made. The plan was to put the system to use gradually. The Minister of Social Affairs 
and Health, Paula Risikko, said that the new plan would be to import the information 
into Kanta in smaller sections. The first phase would include basic information, such as 
the medical history of a patient, list of drugs, laboratory results and referral letters. The 
testing started first in the health center of Kuopio and the health district of Eastern Savo. 
(YLE 8.10.2009; TE 1.11.2009; YLE 10.11.2009.) 
 
In 2011, the schedule was delayed again due synchronizing issues between different 
systems and processes (TE 2.10.2011). A new operative unit at the National Institute for 
Health and Welfare (NIHW) was founded and, at the same time, the schedule was 
intentionally postponed. Head of the new unit, Vesa Jormanainen, thought that after the 
new unit was founded, management of the project improved significantly. Five regional 
coordinators at the NIHW were pointed out to help health districts and municipalities 
with the project. (HS 10.8.2013.) 
 
In September 2012, Kanta was thought to be ready in 2014 (HS 22.9.2012a). In August 
2013, the aim was to have the system in full use by 2016. Annakaisa Iivari, Director at 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, considered the schedule very challenging. 
The system developed by Kela and Fujitsu was already finished but it would have to be 
integrated with all different regional patient data systems. Oldest systems are from the 
80’s. (HS 10.8.2013.) Public sector has seven different systems, which will all be 
integrated with Kanta. In addition, there are several different systems used by the 
private sector (HS 7.9.2013).  
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2.3.2 Costs 
 
Once again, Finland has been compared to Estonia. In Estonia, the entire system – 
including the patient data system and Estonia’s corresponding systems to Kanta and 
ePrescription – cost 10 million euros. Even though we have to keep in mind that they 
created the system from scratch and did not have to deal with dozens of existing 
systems that do not work together (HS 10.9.2012; TE 14.8.2012), some experts say that 
these are just excuses. (YLE 7.5.2013.) 
 
In September 2012, Teemupekka Virtanen, a specialist at the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health, estimated that the project would manage to stay within its budget, which 
was 200 million euros. The National Audit Office calculated that the price would be 
twice as big. Leading inspector at the NAO, Tomi Voutilainen, stated that the sum of 
200 million euros was not a valid estimate, since it only included costs until 2014, by 
which just some parts of the final amount of information would be in the system. He did 
not agree with MSAH thinking that the investment will repay itself by the end of 2017. 
According to NAO’s opinion, there will be no significant savings and the systems will 
repay itself at some point in the 2020’s. (HS 1.10.2012.) 
 
Voutilainen says that their calculations are based on the entire costs, including 
implementation. Also, their price tag includes the costs of the private sector (HS 
1.10.2012). Both facets have calculated that the costs for the public sector will be 200 
million euros. The difference is due to the cost estimates for the private sector, which, 
according to MSAH are 20-30 million euros, while NAO presents a sum of 225 million. 
This is the price for private practices, organizations, and foundations. (HS 10.8.2013.) 
 
Director of the Financial Administration Unit at the NAO, Vesa Jatkola, claims that 
their previous calculations have been very accurate. They believe that, due to the 
number of so many different patient data systems, the private sector will pay a lot more 
fore Kanta than what the public sector does, since the public sector only uses seven 
different patient data systems. MSAH’s calculations are based on the simple fact that 
the private sector is one-fourth the size of the public sector. Most of the money will be 
used for training. (HS 10.8.2013.)  
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2.4 EPrescription 
 
EPrescription is a system designed for writing and managing electronic drug 
prescriptions, and it is a part of the Kanta entity. A physician will write the prescription 
on the computer and transfer it to the Prescription Center, which is maintained by Kela. 
In the pharmacy, a pharmacist will then get the prescription from the Prescription 
Center and provide the patient with the prescribed drugs. (HS 9.9.2012.) 
 
The system is supposed to improve patient security and give physicians the ability to 
better control the synergistic effects of the drugs prescribed to a patient, says project 
manager Johanna Andersson. This will help especially when taking care of the elderly. 
Patients can renew their prescriptions in any pharmacy, and the prescriptions are safe in 
the system and cannot be lost. (YLE 5.4.2011; HS 15.5.2012.) Adults can check their 
own prescriptions online. Patients can still get a paper version upon request but in 2014 
that will no longer be possible, in case the amendment of Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health gets passed (HS 10.9.2013; HS 21.10.2013). 
 
A problem with the ePrescription project, too, has been the variety of different 
information systems that are in use in the country (YLE 5.4.2011). EPrescription has to 
be integrated with two pharmacy systems, seven different public sector patient data 
systems, and several corresponding private sector systems (TE 4.2.2011).  The lack of a 
common system has slowed down the ePrescription project, says MSAH. (HS 
10.9.2013.) Also, the system has been criticized, once again, for having been designed 
to be too comprehensive and, therefore, the result being very stiff  (YLE 8.10.2009). 
 
2.4.1 Project progression 
 
The development of ePrescription started already in 1990 and for the last ten years, the 
project has been urgent. The leading inspector at the National Audit Office, Tomi 
Voutilainen, says that constant haste has been one reason for the delay. The preparations 
were not made properly and, thus, faults have been revealed. Fixing them has made the 
schedule even tighter. The project has not had a proper plan and even the legislation has 
lagged behind. (TE 4.2.2011.) One delay in the beginning was due to deciding on the 
electronic identification. In Finland, there has always been a doctor’s signature on the 
prescription, whereas, in some EU countries doctors can make prescriptions by just 
sending an email (YLE 8.10.2009).  
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EPrescription was supposed to be tested with two different patient data systems, two 
pharmacy systems and the Prescription Centre. After that, the system would be 
implemented first within the public health care and then within the private sector in 
2010 and 2011 (YLE 10.11.2009). The implementation was postponed due to technical 
reasons in autumn 2010. Originally, it was supposed to start in 2009 and by the end of 
2010, half of all prescriptions were supposed to be electronic (TE 4.2.2011; YLE 
4.5.2011). 
 
A new schedule was made, according to which all pharmacies should have the ability to 
deal with ePrescriptions by April 2012. Public health care would have to write all 
prescriptions electronically as of April 2013, and private health care a year later. 
Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Kari Välimäki, estimated 
that the system would be implemented in major part of Finland during the year 2011. 
(TE 4.2.2011; HS 15.5.2012.)  
 
Project progression: Milestones 
 
The millionth ePrescription was written in April 2012. Though it sounds like a big 
number, the annual number of prescriptions written in Finland is 51 million. (HS 
15.5.2012.) In May 2012, one third of the operators within the public health care had 
put ePrescriptions to use. Not one operator from the private sector had joined the project, 
even though more than one million Finns use occupational health care provided by the 
private sector. (HS 15.5.2012.) In October 2012, ePrescription was in use in half of the 
health centers and hospitals in Finland. The share would soon rise, since, at that point, 
the implementation in the Helsinki and the HUS region was taking place (HS 
21.10.2012). 
 
By April 2013, 1,5 million electronic prescriptions had been written. 70 percent of 
prescriptions written with a patient data system were electronic. Still, there were big 
regional differences in the use of ePrescription. In the metropolitan area, Central 
Finland and Northern Carelia region, the use was extensive, whereas especially within 
the health districts of Kanta-Häme, Vaasa, and Northern Ostrobothnia, there was 
significant variation within the district. Some explained that the differences were due to 
lack of resources – writing an electronic prescription is slower than writing a traditional 
paper version. Project Manager Riitta Konttinen from the National Institute for Health 
and Welfare commented that some health districts made the decision to put the system 
to use immediately everywhere, and some took a slower approach. Also, possible 
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changing of information systems may have slowed down the implementation. (YLE 
2.4.2013.) 
 
By the end of May 2013, 10 million electronic prescriptions had been written. Also, a 
light version of the systems was being designed. This version would enable prescription 
writing on a mobile phone or through a browser, and would therefore not link the use of 
ePrescription to a patient data system. Physicians could write electronic prescriptions 
anywhere. (HS 29.5.2013.) In October 2013, 80 000 - 100 000 ePrescriptions were 
written every day (TE 23.10.2013). 
 
2.4.2 Costs 
 
In 2011, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health estimated the costs of ePrescription 
to be 70 million euros in years 2007-2015. The investment of pharmacies would be 21 
million euros and municipalities would pay 5-10 million in implementation cost. 
Annual costs for these operators would be 0,5 and 2 million euros. (TE 4.2.2011.) In 
Estonia, a system similar to ePrescription cost less than a million euros and was put to 
use in less than a year, in 2010. Two years later 90 percent of all prescriptions were 
electronic (TE 14.8.2012). 
 
2.4.3 Issues 
 
Kotka was one of the first municipalities to implement the ePrescription in April 2011. 
The project was delayed both in Kotka and in another pilot city, Turku, because of 
compatibility issues with other systems. Jaakko Vuolasto from MediIT in Kotka says, 
that the legislators had unrealistic schedules. (YLE 5.4.2011.) 
 
In September 2011, the writing of ePrescriptions had to be aborted in Päijät-Häme, 
Eastern Savo and Kotka. An error in the system was noticed in seven health centers in 
Lahti on September 22nd. Due to the error, there was a possibility of false drugs having 
been prescribed to patients: either ones that were not in use anymore or drugs that were 
meant for other patients. A leading physician at Päijät-Häme, Petteri Jyrkinen, was 
afraid that the problem would escalate, so they decided to communicate about the 
problem widely, in order to avoid patient damage. 140 000 electronic prescriptions had 
already been written before the error was noticed. (YLE 23.9.2011; YLE 24.9.2011; TE 
26.9.2011.) 
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The use of ePrescriptions could be continued in Turku and Kemi-Tornio, since they 
used the other one of the two possible patient data systems, which, at that point, were 
used for writing ePrescriptions (YLE 23.9.2011). The problem applied only to Tieto’s 
Effica patient data system (TE 26.9.2011). Even before this problem, the Logica’s 
Pegasos had worked slightly better than Effica (YLE 14.5.2012). 
 
Tieto Oyj immediately started an investigation on the error. Sinikka Rantala, the 
regional manager for the ePrescription project in Päijät-Häme, hoped that the reason 
behind the error would be found quickly. She was not aware of similar errors in other 
regions. Development Manager Anne Kallio from the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health thought that the error was very rare but would have to be investigated carefully 
before implementing the system in more regions. (YLE 23.9.2011.) 
 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health had an emergency meeting with Tieto, Kela, 
and the health center that had first noticed the problem. Tieto had quickly located the 
error, which they described as “illogicalities in the system”. Combining certain options 
while using the system caused problematic situations. (YLE 24.9.2011.) Tieto claimed 
that the error was not caused by an error in the programming, rather than physicians 
having difficulties using the new system. The logic behind the prescription writing 
process was improved (TE 26.9.2011). 
 
The errors were fixed during the following weekend but the system remained banned 
for testing. During the weekend, pharmacies had to verify all electronic prescriptions by 
calling the physician and, after that, physicians started writing paper prescriptions again. 
Development Manager Anne Kallio stated that the ban would not be ceased before the 
testing had been done properly. Luckily, there were no knowable cases, in which the 
patient would have gotten wrong drugs. (YLE 24.9.2011; TE 26.9.2011.) 
 
The ban was cancelled on October 5th and Kotka put the system to use two days later. 
Improvements made to the system would not allow the physicians to open several 
patients’ information at the same time, in order to prevent mix-ups in the prescriptions. 
Also, physicians would receive more training on how to use the system. (YLE 
6.10.2011.) 
 
For Kotka, the project cost hundreds of thousands of euros. Being a pilot city did not 
entitle it to any reductions in the price of the final system. The Health Director of Kotka, 
Anne Hiiri, thought that it was a mistake to become a pilot city. The project cost almost 
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half a million euros, of which Kotka paid some 80 percent. Anyhow, patients were 
mostly satisfied with the new system. (YLE 28.9.2011.) 
 
Later on, the implementation was easier, since most of the problems had been fixed 
earlier. In Espoo, for example, the implementation was executed in phases. The system 
was first piloted in one health center. Then, the system would be put to use in other 
health centers, hospital wards, and nursing homes. Dental care would be within the 
system a few months later. (HS 9.9.2012.) 
 
After the system had been in use for a while, other major problems emerged. Pressing 
the tabulator would tenfold the dosing of drugs. Also, prescriptions simply disappeared 
from the system. In Forssa, the system was not put to use in special health care and even 
in primary health care the usage was limited. There were reported to be 150 
programming errors and physicians found it very difficult to use the system. After 
having spotted the errors, they tried to contact the vendor in vain. Only after the matter 
became public, the officials reacted to the issue. (YLE 14.5.2011.) The National 
Institute for Health and Welfare forbid the use of the tabulator while writing the 
instructions for dosing the drug. (YLE 14.5.2012.) 
 
In April 2013, another problem emerged. The number of characters in the text fields had 
been limited so that all necessary information could not fit into them. NIHW and Kela 
were investigating how the problem could be solved, since it had caused a lot of 
feedback. Riitta Konttinen from NIHW said that the problem would be expensive and 
slow to fix; it would take approximately 1,5 years. Konttinen did not think that the issue 
would cause any risk for patients. Pharmacists always go through the prescription with 
the patient for one more time, and there is also the possibility to still use paper 
prescriptions. Physicians participate in the designing process of such systems but it is 
the user experience that tells the final truth. The feedback would be paid attention to and 
the system would be developed further. (YLE 2.4.2013.) 
 
There were regional problems, too. In Southern Carelia, the system got very slow and 
had to be fixed in May-June 2013. At its worst, technical problems caused hours of 
extra time to be wasted for the physicians. Otherwise, the situation in the Southern 
Carelia health district (EKSOTE) was good: 92 percent of the prescriptions written were 
electronic and the percentage was best in the entire country. According to Veli-Pekka 
Helvola, IT Manager at EKSOTE, the share of ePrescriptions has usually been lower in 
organizations, which also take care of special health care. In EKSOTE, good planning 
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and training were factors that led to the good share. EPrescription was put to use in 
EKSOTE in January 2011. (YLE 7.6.2013.) 
 
EPrescriptions are very expensive to use for small private practices; especially for 
dentists, who only write two prescriptions pro week, on average. According to 
calculations made by the Finnish Dental Association, the investment costs can be up to 
127 euros pro prescription. The use of ePrescriptions requires a patient data system that 
is compatible with Kanta, and, also the information security needs to be ensured (TE 
23.10.2013.) Not everyone has the technical skills to purchase and maintain such 
systems, and to get Kela’s approval for them. A psychiatrist even put up an address on 
behalf of keeping the paper prescription (HS 21.10.2013). 
 
2.5 Apotti 
 
Apotti is a new health care information system of the Hospital District of Helsinki and 
Uusimaa (HUS). The system is supposed to be both a patient data and an ERP system 
(YLE 8.5.2013; HS 26.8.2013) and it will affect the health care of over a million people 
(YLE 24.1.2013b). Apotti can be put to use in 2016, at the earliest (HS 13.11.2012), but 
the current schedule aims at 2017 (YLE 13.12.2012) or at 2018  (YLE 8.5.2013). 
 
The purpose of the system is to replace several other systems that are now in use, so that 
physicians can find all relevant patient information in one place. An electronic patient 
data system improves patient service and safety, since the patient data, including 
allergies, medical history and medication, is available for all health care institutions 
(YLE 11.12.2012; HS 26.8.2013). The system should improve the communication 
between different units and save time for physicians, who now have to work with many 
different systems (HS 13.11.2012; YLE 21.1.2013; HS 3.2.2013). Professor and Chief 
Physician, Mauno Vanhala, even claims that poor patient data systems have caused a 
serious decrease in the number of patients taken care of each day (HS 19.9.2013). 
 
The goal is to include many kind of information into Apotti. In addition to the system 
being a patient data and an ERP system, patients can save information about, for 
instance, their exercise habits into the system. The ERP features will, for instance, help 
optimize the placing of patient to different departments, and improve the utilization of 
different equipment. (YLE 8.5.2013.) In the end, Apotti is more than just a 
technological tool. The project aims at renewing and standardizing policies and 
processes in the whole country (HS 4.11.2013). The Head of Social and Health Services 
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in Espoo, Juha Metso, says that even good systems do not help if the processes are bad 
(YLE 24.1.2013b).  
 
2.5.1 Project progression 
 
Apotti started from HUS, Helsinki and Vantaa needing new patient data systems. Later 
on, Kerava, Kirkkonummi, Espoo and Kauniainen joined the project but both Espoo and 
Kerava decided to withdraw from the project at a later stage (HS 21.8.2013b). To begin 
with, Espoo was in a different situation than many of the other cities, since it has a 
newer patient data system that works fine. Also, a remarkable share of Espoo’s 
inhabitants uses occupational health care instead of public (HS 24.1.2013). 
 
Originally, the tendering for Apotti was supposed to start already in September 2012 but 
at that point, not one of the six municipalities had decided on the matter (YLE 
12.9.2012). There has been delays in the decision making process. In September 2012, 
the Health Committee of Helsinki decided that they needed more time to consider the 
Apotti project before they would agree on Helsinki being a part of it, so they left the 
issue on the table for three weeks (HS 11.9.2012; YLE 12.9.2012). 
 
In October 2012, the Departments of Social Services and Health Care in Helsinki 
decided to put the Apotti project on hold for more research. The committees insisted on 
the officials looking for possibilities to purchase the system in smaller parts. Also, they 
wanted a risk analysis for delays in different options. The chairman of the city board 
thought that the further investigations were a positive thing but he hoped that the issue 
could be dealt with again soon. The issue was processed further five weeks later with 
some additions; it should be made possible to add the social services to the same system 
later on. (HS 2.10.2012; HS 13.11.2012; YLE 13.12.2012.) 
 
In January 2013, the city council of Espoo suggested, and the city board later on 
approved on, the city withdrawing from the Apotti project (YLE 21.1.2013; HS 
21.8.2013b; TE 28.1.2013). Espoo thought that the project was too ambitious and had 
too big a goal. To renew all systems and processes at once would be a risky job, 
especially when the entire social and health care system in Finland is soon going to be 
reorganized. In addition, the city thought that the system fails to take the private sector 
into account, and it is not said that a system designed for special health care will be 
suitable for primary health care. (HS 23.1.2013; HS 24.1.2013; TE 30.1.2013; HS 
26.8.2013.) 
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Espoo intends to develop its own customer data system so that the data will be available 
for different operators, not just those within health care. Espoo wants a more agile 
system that is free from committing to one vendor but develops its own system to be 
compatible with Apotti, Kanta and the Finnish X-Road. The city claims that the seven 
different counterparts in the Apotti project do not have a mutual strategy, a management 
system or models for service production. Also, the project includes huge operational and 
financial risks.  (YLE 21.1.2013; HS 21.1.2013; HS 24.1.2013; HS 28.1.2013; YLE 
28.1.2013.) 
 
Espoo’s decision was criticized for complicating the work at its Jorvi Hospital, which is 
part of the Helsinki University Central Hospital’s (HUCH) emergency clinic group. 
Therefore, the residents of Espoo are now in an inferior position when it comes to 
communication and patient safety. The Head of Social and Health Services in Espoo, 
Juha Metso, admits that the situation is not ideal as it is. Espoo will develop its own 
system that is compatible with both Apotti and Kanta. (YLE 24.1.2013a; HS 
24.1.2013.) Espoo did not find the project too expensive (HS 28.1.2013).  
 
Juha Metso did not believe that Espoo backing out would affect the costs of the 
remaining counterparts, since HUS pays half of the costs in the preparation phase (YLE 
24.1.2013b, YLE 28.2.2013). In the end, Espoo leaving increased the preparation phase 
costs for Helsinki for about 340 000 euros (HS 24.4.2013). The remaining 
municipalities would have to re-evaluate their participation. After the negotiations have 
been finished and the vendor has been chosen, each municipality will make their 
decision. It is possible to join the project at a later phase, within a few years time. These 
municipalities will pay their share of the preparation phase afterwards. (YLE 
28.2.2013.) 
 
Kauniainen decided to continue in the project in May 2013, since they did not think they 
would have enough resources and IT knowledge to cope on their own. Still, the situation 
may change if the new SOTE-reformation will force the city to join Espoo’s social and 
health services (YLE 29.5.2013). Vantaa made the decision to continue with the project 
in June (HS 17.6.2013). Kerava, on the other hand, decided to draw out in August. The 
IT administration of Kerava recommended that the city would join the project in the 
second phase in 2020, together with Tuusula and Järvenpää. There were many reasons 
behind the decision. The city doubted the suitability and necessity of the system, and 
that it might be put to use unfinished. They feared that they wouldn’t have gotten 
enough authority compared to the costs. Also, the Social and Health Director of Kerava 
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had resigned and the project would have had to be started with a substitute. (TE 
20.8.2013; HS 21.8.2013b.)  
 
Project progression: New leader 
 
In February 2013 it was announced that the Apotti project would get a new leader, in 
order to strengthen the ICT know-how within the project. According to the job 
advertisement, the applicant was expected to have experience in successfully managing 
big IT and change projects. The previous leader, medical doctor Antti Iivanainen, would 
continue with developing operations. There was no mistrust of him. (YLE 13.2.2013; 
TE 5.3.2013; HS 21.5.2013.) 
 
33 three applicants were interested in the position but most of them were consultants 
and IT managers, and very few of them had executive experience or knowledge on 
health care information systems. It seemed like those with most experience in these 
systems decided not to even apply for the position. It would be very difficult to choose 
the new leader for the project.  (TE 27.3.2013.)  
 
The Social and Health Department Development Manager of Kerava, Hannu Välimäki 
was chosen to be the new head of the Apotti project in May 2013. Previously, he had 
worked for Itella and Basware, gotten a lot of experience in both business 
administration and information systems, and – according to his own words – decades of 
experience in buying information systems. (HS 21.5.2013; HS 22.5.2013.) Välimäki’s 
first statement was that it would be time to do one big IT project right – there would be 
enough money, manpower and experience to succeed. He thought that the project would 
finish on time and within the budget. Also, such a big project would attract many 
vendors, which increases the negotiation power of the buyer. Finding a solution and a 
vendor would not be a problem, and the contract should be signed by the end of year 
2014. (TE 22.5.2013; HS 22.5.2013.) 
 
Still, the schedule – according to which the building of the systems will happen during 
years 2015-2016 and the implementation in 2017 – is very tight. The decision-making 
process in the municipalities plays a big role and may cause surprises. Also, it is hard to 
tell an exact budget before the contract is signed. The public discussion on the project 
has been very negative, and Välimäki thinks that it is needless to compare the systems 
between Finland and Estonia. (TE 22.5.2013.) 
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2.5.2 Costs 
 
Renewing the patient data systems in the whole of Finland is estimated to cost 1,8 
billion euros (HS 8.7.2012; HS 10.9.2012). The price for HUS’s Apotti is 
approximately 350-450 million euros during ten years. The costs consist of, among 
other things, licenses, training of personnel, converting the old patient data, and 
tailoring the system to suit the Finnish system and legislation. Training of personnel is 
considered to be a huge expenditure, since HUS is one of the biggest public sector 
employees in Finland. (HS 10.9.2012; YLE 19.11.2012.) HUS pays for half of the 
expenses and municipalities for the other half, according to their population. (HS 
4.6.2013.) Since municipalities finance the operations of HUS, it means that also those 
municipalities, who do not participate in the project, will still have to pay for the system 
(HS 26.8.2013). 
 
In September 2012, there was even a 400-person demonstration against the costs of 
Apotti. The demonstrators insisted on the politicians responsible for deciding about the 
project having reliable and neutral information on the situation. The demonstrators also 
demanded for a proper risk assessment and making it possible for small and medium 
sized companies to take part in the tendering, too. (HS 11.9.2012; YLE 13.12.2012.) 
Even after the demonstration, there was a lot of public discussion on the subject on 
Facebook (YLE 12.9.2012).  
 
The Director of Social and Health Office in Vantaa, Ari Toiva, says that it is seldom 
when information systems raise this much interest. Anyhow, the discussion on the costs 
has not been quite right. Currently, Vantaa uses 5 million euros a year on patient data 
systems and after the implementation of Apotti, the sum will be 4 million euros. Of 
course, during the transition phase, the city will pay for both systems but, still, the 
repayment time is estimated to be no more than 7-8 years. (YLE 12.9.2012.) 
 
Many other experts agree with Toiva, saying that the relevance of costs has been 
exaggerated in the discussion. They claim that even the renewing of the patient data 
systems in the whole of Finland would repay its costs of 1,8 billion euros in seven years. 
The ICT Director of the Public Administration, Timo Vallin, thinks that the sum is 
enormously big but that one system would benefit the country more than the current 
patchwork of systems. (YLE 14.9.2012.) 
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The director of the Apotti project, Antti Iivanainen, says that, currently, the annual sum 
used on patient data systems in the metropolitan area is 50 million euros, and the sum 
does not include system development costs. The costs of the new system will be about 
the same and the new system will enable better patient service. The current situation is 
not satisfactory. (YLE 14.9.2012.) Still, Iivanainen admits that the project is risky. The 
price of many similar systems has multiplied in the implementation phase (YLE 
14.9.2012.) 
 
Costs have been compared to Estonia all the time (YLE 14.9.2012; YLE 20.9.2012). 
The Estonian expert, who was one of the designers of their patient data system, Madis 
Tiik, and other experts say that the prices – 1,8 billion and 11 million euros – are not 
comparable, since the structure of both the health care systems and societies in the two 
countries are different. In Estonia, municipalities do not produce health services but the 
operators are all private facets, which get orders from insurance companies. In Finland, 
there are 350 different operators with different systems. Tiik thinks that the biggest 
costs in Finland will result from taking down old systems, building new ones and 
standardizing them. (YLE 17.9.2012; YLE 20.9.2012.)  
 
2.5.3 Issues 
 
The project has faced a lot of critic. It is considered too expensive and vulnerable (YLE 
21.1.2013). IT expert and non-fiction author Tapio Järvenpää says that there are big 
risks concerning the project management methods, cost calculation, and the aggressive 
implementation schedule of Apotti. The system should be developed together with a 
network of vendors instead of HUS purchasing it from just vendor. There should also be 
strict national standards to mark out guidelines for such information systems. 
Furthermore, according to Järvenpää, Finland should have focused on purchasing a 
national system instead of letting health districts develop their own solutions. (YLE 
7.5.2013.)  
 
Järvenpää claims that by purchasing a system that has not previously been used, HUS is 
giving the vendor a monopoly status to develop it. He doubts, whether there will be 
enough knowledge to maintain the system. It is also a risk that if HUS purchases a 
mammoth system from one vendor, all the experts will be tied to maintaining that 
system and no other operator can purchase the same system later on. (YLE 7.5.2013.) 
Even internationally, it has been a trend to favor mammoth-like systems that promise to 
solve all problems as once. Such projects are hard to manage and often fail, as happened 
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in UK and Denmark. Risks increase, if the system is not build on current foundations 
and by scaling them. (TE 30.1.2013.) 
 
Like Järvenpää, many other experts, too, doubt that the facets buying Apotti have 
enough knowledge to succeed in the gigantic project. They fear of vendor trap (TE 
30.1.2013; YLE 8.5.2013). Software developer Otso Kivekäs says that not one of the 47 
persons in the project team seem to have any education in information technology. It is 
understandable that doctors do not know how to purchase such software, thus, HUS 
should immediately strengthen its IT know-how (YLE 12.9.2012). 
 
Kivekäs claims that HUS wants to buy of-the-shelf software since it does not have the 
knowledge to do anything else. American software does not necessarily work in Finland, 
even if some tailoring was made. Finland should learn from Denmark, where just the 
basic standards are defined on a national level, and each health districts can then have 
changes done in co-operation with any vendor they choose. If a vendor first sells 
software and then charges for any changes, updates and fixes, it is in their interest that 
the software does not work properly and requires lot of work afterwards, says Kivekäs. 
(YLE 12.9.2012.) 
 
Patient data systems are very complicated and technically challenging. It is difficult to 
do the specification of features in advances, which often leads to vendor traps and costly 
changes afterwards. Important for the success of the project is that the development is 
divided into phases, and that the approach is modular, scalable and takes future changes 
in the environment into account. A kernel system like Apotti does not fill these criteria. 
Maria Alaranta, a PhD at the University of Copenhagen, wonders if Apotti is flexible 
enough for the future innovations that we will definitely need, when the population gets 
older. (TE 30.1.2013.) 
 
The Director of the Apotti project, Antti Iivanainen, and the Technical Director, Jari 
Renko, say that some of the critic is based on false information. The Apotti project is 
often mixed with the Kanta entirety (STM 21.9.2012; HS 22.9.2012a.). The first phase 
is just to renew the system of HUS and some of its member municipalities. According 
to Iivanainen, the goal is to purchase a system that is scalable in the future. Apotti will 
be integrated with other systems, even such that are still under development, like Kanta 
and the Finnish X-Road. (YLE 8.5.2013.) 
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HUS will buy a big software entity, to which possible additional modules then can be 
joined (YLE 19.11.2012). The Chief Administrative Physician of HUS, Lasse Lehtonen 
claims that the project is too big for smaller vendors having enough resources to cope 
with, among others, the responsibility issues. Lehtonen wants to be sure that the systems 
works and, therefore, requires that there are user experiences on the system, in other 
words that it is an of-the-shelf software. (YLE 12.9.2012; HS 2.10.2012.) One 
alternative for tendering would be to build up an own system but it would be extremely 
difficult (YLE 14.9.2012). 
 
Iivanainen claims that is better to purchase a big system, since the buyer is then more 
interesting for the vendors and will have better negotiation power. It will be made sure 
that the development will not rely on only one the vendor but, still, having just a 
technical framework, where different vendors would buy the needed modules, would 
require too much technological skills and time of the personnel (YLE 8.5.2013).  Sitra 
recruited Madis Tiik, the Estonian expert, who was one of the designers of their patient 
data system, to Finland and says he is available for more research on the patient data 
systems. (YLE 17.9.2012; HS 17.9.2012.)  
 
Also, in the Apotti project, procurement is conducted by direct purchasing, which is a 
better way than open procedure. The buyer can clarify its needs in comprehensive 
negotiations with one or several vendors before committing to the deal (Act on Public 
Procurement 30.3.2007/348). It reduces the risk to exceed the schedule or the budget. 
(HS 14.10.2012.)  
 
Issues: Security 
 
In several other systems, needs to fix the information security have been found at a later 
stage, which can be very costly. The costs can be 6-10 times bigger if changes are made 
afterwards. Information security should be tested thoroughly in the pilot phase so that 
possible needs for fixing can be done on the expense of the vendor. (YLE 19.11.2012.) 
 
In the US, patient data of 21 million people has ended up in the wrong hands in just a 
couple of years, mostly because of employees handling the data carelessly. Companies 
in the information security industry have been interested in the Apotti-project. 
Information security should be taken into account already when outlining the contract, 
since patient data is very private information. The biggest concern is that the system 
will be too big to control. It is easier to monitor security in the interfaces of different 
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systems. ICT Development Director of HUS, Mikko Rotonen, says that the experts’ 
viewpoints will be taken into account. (YLE 19.11.2012.) 
 
There are other risks, too. For instance, in Northern Carelia a fault in the grid resulted in 
no one being able to use the patient data system. When a patient data system crashes, 
there is no information available on the patient (YLE 11.12.2012). 
 
Issues: Vendors 
 
Vendors have constantly been criticized for selling too expensive and unnecessary 
software with such contracts that tie the buyer to them so that they are able to change 
what ever they want to (HS 4.11.2013). The Sirius project caused a scandal in 2012. In 
2010, the Finnish Innovation Fund, Sitra, started a project called Sirius that was 
supposed to help in the selection of a patient data system. Accenture delivered a report, 
which recommended two systems: Cerner and Epic, of which Epic got the best reviews. 
A year after two project ended, it turned out that Accenture had become the designer 
and implementer of Epic in Finland. Sitra was not aware of the connection. Accenture 
has not agreed to comment on the issue. (HS 8.7.2012; HS 10.9.2012; YLE 12.9.2012.) 
 
Municipalities and health districts can decide for themselves, which patient data systems 
they will acquire. The Sirius project will provide information to help with the decision 
(HS 8.7.2012). Also, the success of the Apotti project may have an effect on what other 
municipalities and health districts decide, so it is possible that the entire sum of almost 
two billion euros goes to one vendor (HS 10.9.2012). 
 
Accenture and Epic were one of the vendors or joint ventures of vendors who took part 
in the tendering and handed out their offer for the system by November 2013. The 
negotiations with three to six vendors should start in February 2014 and the final vendor 
will be chosen and the contract signed by spring 2015. The following vendors and joint 
ventures of vendors entered the competition (YLE 5.11.2013): 
Atos IT Solutions and Services Oy 
BearingPoint Finland Oy 
CGI Suomi Oy 
ChipSoft ZIS B.V. 
CompuGroup Medical Sweden Ab 
Epic and Accenture 
IBM Finland Oy Ab 
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Indra Sistemas S.A. and Affecto Finland Oy 
InterSystems Corporation 
Tieto Healthcare & Welfare Oy 
 
2.5.4 Patient data systems in other countries 
 
As mentioned, the systems in Finland have often been compared to the ones in Estonia. 
In Estonia, the entire system – including the patient data system and Estonia’s 
corresponding systems to Kanta and ePrescription – cost 10 million euros. More than 95 
percent of physicians in Estonia use the electronic patient data system. (HS 10.9.2012.) 
In the Estonian patient data systems, the amount of buttons and steps has been reduced 
for better usability. Doctors can edit their view by choosing their most used features to 
the front page. In addition, new reports can be created without outside help. The system 
works as a cloud service. (LL 10.8.2012.)  
 
Denmark has focused on data transfer. Their system simply transfers patient data 
between different organizations, which means that doctors could keep using their old 
systems and that the new solution required very little investments and had only minor 
risks. The operators put the system into use voluntarily. (TE 30.1.2013.) Now Denmark 
has a working system, where citizens can see their own diagnosis, make appointments 
and even send messages directly to their doctors. Doctors see the patient’s entire 
medical history. (HS 3.2.2013.) 
 
Representatives of many other countries visit Denmark to learn from their success. 
Another factor in their success is MedCom, which is an organization that is responsible 
for standardizing information between municipalities, IT vendors and the state. The 
Main Architect of the IT systems in the Århus Health District, Mogens Engsig-Krup, 
also points out that the systems got to develop slowly. A similar success story would not 
be possible anymore. (HS 3.2.2013.) 
 
There are failures, too. In UK, developing the patient data system took 9 years and cost 
3,15 billion euros. The project is about to be aborted. In Germany, 1,7 billion euros 
were wasted before they decided to abandon their project. In France, the system seems 
to be failing for a second time and the Netherlands gave up several years ago. (HS 
3.2.2013.) 
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2.6 Summary 
 
There is an overall lack of a coherent IT strategy in Finland. This can be seen in 
legislation, decision-making, and organizing of IT operations. The legislation is lagging 
behind and sometimes even hindering the development of the IT infrastructure in the 
country. The Act on Public Procurement does not support the procurement of 
information systems, and many other acts fail to take the private health care sector into 
account. The legislation should not be too strict but in a country with this many (7000) 
public information systems, common standards are needed. 
 
The complexity and tardiness of public decision-making is not considered when making 
the IT project schedules. Another structural problem seems to be the organizing of the 
state’s IT operations. The operations are scattered and lead by no one, which has lead to 
many small and overlapping projects. New strategies are made before old projects are 
finished, sometimes in order to cover up old mistakes. Now the state is putting up a new 
IT company to solve these problems. Overall, there should not be a shortage in 
resources – Finland uses the second most money on public electronic services in Europe.  
 
Monitoring is clearly insufficient, since issues with some projects have even lead to 
official investigations. Neglecting of monitoring has lead to small and overlapping 
projects, and to poorly integrated systems. There are no common models to follow when 
executing public IT projects. Failing projects are not aborted in time. Better 
documentation could lead to learning over organizational borders and to public 
discussion about the mistakes. 
 
Problems in health care information system projects seem to match the overall situation 
very well. One of the fundamental issues is that the foundations are not in order – there 
are simply too many different public information systems that are not integrated with 
each other. Some of the systems are very old and it is very difficult to integrate them 
with the new ones. There seems to be a lack of consistency: should the old systems be 
integrated or new ones be built, and should the systems be nation-wide or regional? 
National systems would reduce scatteredness but they may cause problems with vendors. 
Anyway, the lack of a common strategy causes the results to remain limited and only 
regional. 
 
Vendor trap is an often-used word – and a very feared situation when it comes to 
information system projects. Vendors are accused of several transgressions and abuse of 
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dominant market positions. The market in Finland is very oligopolistic. Same big 
vendors are used again and again, despite the previous problems, because purchasing 
one system from one vendor is an easier solution than creating a framework for several 
different vendors and systems to fill in. Projects could be divided into smaller parts and 
more open interfaces used but buyers claim that big projects attract more vendors, 
which then gives the buyer better negotiation power. Skeptics are afraid of big projects 
and systems resulting in the vendor’s monopoly to further develop the system. Also, in 
a small country like Finland, all available resources may end up being tied to 
maintaining the system of one single operator, so that no one else can purchase the same 
system in the future. 
 
There is a lack of knowledge in how to co-operate with the vendors. The overall 
atmosphere seems to be very confronting: both facets keep blaming the other one. 
Programmers do not understand the end-users and physicians find it hard to 
communicate their wishes further in the development process. Final systems are said to 
be stiff and difficult to use. There are illogicalities, technical problems and 
programming errors. Faults have been very slow to fix, since vendors do not seem 
interested in fixing them and developing the systems further. Systems have problems 
with keeping up with the legislation, and they lack ability to compile statistics and 
artificial intelligence. There are too many systems to be used simultaneously and end-
users do not receive a proper amount of training. Still, most of the problems are just 
slowing down the physicians’ daily work and do not risk patient safety.  
 
One distinctive cultural issue can be pointed out: there seems to be a will to try to solve 
all problems at once – a certain pursuit of perfection – which causes the plans to 
escalate. Projects are too ambitious and the aims too big, which makes them so slow 
that the world changes around them. Plans and specifications get old before the projects 
reach their goals. Often, it is difficult to do system specifications in advance so future 
needs are not taken into account in the contracts. For instance, many facets highlight the 
importance of being able to add social services to health care systems in the future.  
 
There are several very basic project management issues that the news articles point out. 
The projects are expensive, delayed and inefficient. Still, these are just the outcomes 
and there must be some reasons behind these problems. Overall, the preparations are 
bad. Management is said to be poor and incoherent, there are not enough resources and 
knowledge and the schedules are too tight and even aggressive. This results in bad 
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quality. Also, budgeting seems to be a problem: cost calculation fails and the estimates 
of different facets vary significantly. 
 
Commitment has been a problem especially in the Apotti-project. Missing of a clear 
authority leads to doubts. Espoo claimed that there is a lack of a mutual strategy and a 
management system, and mutual models for service production in the project. After all, 
it is just not about a information system but about integrating a big amount of various 
processes, too. They consider the project too risky and want to develop a more agile 
system that is not tied to one vendor. Kerava doubted the suitability and necessity of the 
whole system. The upcoming SOTE-reformation causes confusion everywhere. 
 
Commitment goes hand in hand with the public image of the projects – especially since 
politics is involved. Politicians have to keep their voters in mind and if the overall 
public attitude is negative, they will probably reconsider their own opinions. Poor 
commitment will then further contribute to the negative public image. Public discussion 
of the projects is often based on false facts and irrelevant comparisons. More reliable 
and neutral information should be available both for the experts and the public. 
 
Finland is often compared to Estonia, which seems to have nothing but successful and 
cheap public information systems. The difference is that Estonia got to start from 
scratch without the burden of old systems, and vendors have not gotten such a dominant 
market position. Also, the health care systems of the two countries are totally different. 
But above all, Estonia seems to have a common IT strategy, which is supported by their 
efficient decision-making and legislation. They use the electronic identification as a 
basis for all their systems. 
 
Denmark is another country that is often referred to when talking about successful 
public IT projects.  Their solution is to have certain standards on national level but to 
then let the regional operators decide on the rest. Also, they have aborted unsuccessful 
projects. The news articles present these two countries as pure success but we have to 
keep in mind that they may want to maintain and boost such an image, since they are 
involved in introducing and selling their systems and knowledge to other countries. 
 
There are positive things are examples, too. In Central Finland, 15 information systems 
that were used in the region were successfully merged. In the Southern Carelia health 
district (EKSOTE), the use of ePrescription has been extensive due to good planning 
and training. Espoo succeeded in the gradual implementation of the same system. Some 
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districts have measured the patient satisfaction with the system and the results have 
been good. 
 
Hannu Välimäki, the new leader of the Apotti project, thinks that there is enough money, 
manpower and experience to succeed in the project. A new lighter and end-user 
friendlier version of Apotti is being designed: this version will enable physicians to 
write electronic prescriptions anywhere without a patient data system.  
 
Further hypothesis 
 
A clear and coherent IT strategy plays an important role both on national, project and 
municipal level.  
 Part of the success of Estonia is due to its good IT strategy. Both decision-
making, legislation and the overall culture support the development of a good IT 
insrastructure. On a project level, lack of a clear strategy may cause confusion 
and uncommitment. In municipalities, a good strategy can help to improve 
system implementations, and to clarify and speed up the decision-making. 
 
Better models for monitoring and evaluation of projects are needed 
 Insufficient monitoring leads to small and overlapping projects, which means 
wasted resources and limited results. When executing public IT projects, the 
following of common models could give better results. Better documentation 
could lead to public discussion about the mistakes and to learning over 
organizational borders. Regional differences could be used for benchmarking. 
 
Better models for procurement are needed 
 The Act on Public Procurement does not serve procurement of information 
systems. There should be better instructions and more infromation available on 
what to take into account and how to prevent the most common mistakes from 
happening. By developing the procurement, buyers will be able to use more 
vendors, which will reduce the current problem of only a  few usable vendors. 
 
The current software development method/s are not the best option 
 Another software development method could be the solution to many current 
problems: end-users feel that they are not participated in the development 
process, they find the systems poor and the further development of them 
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insufficient. Also, the original developing is so slow that the final systems are 
out-dated. 
 
End-user participation in both designing and implementing an information system pretty 
much determines the success of the project 
 What determines the success of an information system is whether it will be used 
or not. Involving end-users in the development of the system, and providing 
them with proper training in the implementation phase will increase their 
commitment and result in better usage of the system. 
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3 THEORY 
The theoretical part of this Master’s Thesis consists of four different parts. The first 
subchapter shortly presents the prevailing situation that affects the success of the health 
care information systems: the health care system in Finland, the decision-making 
process, the Act on Public Procurement, and the vendor market structure. The meaning 
and importance of IT strategy is presented shortly in the second subchapter. 
 
The third subchapter introduces project procurement according to Pekka Forselius’ book 
on successful information system procurement. It is considered de facto standard in 
Finland and covers procurement preparation, choosing the vendor and solution, 
monitoring, and finishing of the project. A Finnish book is used, since law and 
established policies are factors that highly affect and contribute to the success of 
procurement.  
 
In order to get the end-users to use the system, we need to understand the factors that 
contribute to their acceptance of the systems. The fourth subchapter discusses what the 
end-users’ hopes for health care information systems (HCIS) are in the light of recent 
studies, and which software development method (SDM) would be best in order to 
fulfill the wishes. According to the news articles, there are significant problems in the 
design and development processes of HCIS. The chapter also presents implementation 
and evaluation related issues. 
 
3.1 Structural and legislative basis 
 
The success of different countries’ HCIS projects is not directly comparable. All 
countries have different political and health care systems that affect the planning and 
execution of such projects. The European Union enjoins public tendering but on the 
contrary to public belief, according to the Finnish MEP Sirpa Pietikäinen, EU does not 
force or encourage to do purchasing based solely on the price (YLE 4.2.2013).  
 
3.1.1 Health care system in Finland 
 
The basis of the Finnish health care system in Finland is the municipal social and health 
care that is sponsored by the government In addition, the private sector produces health 
services. The Ministry of Social affairs and Health is responsible for controlling and 
developing the social and health care system. (STM 2013a: 10.) 
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Municipalities are responsible for organizing health care services for their inhabitants. 
They can either produce the services for themselves or together with joint municipal 
authorities, or purchase the services from private sector operators, other municipalities 
or third sector organizations. The services are principally funded with municipal tax 
income but the government sponsors the services with certain subsidies that are similar 
to equalization payments. Municipalities form health districts that are responsible for 
providing special health care services in the region. There are 20 health districts in 
continental Finland. Åland has its own system. Each health district is a part of one of the 
five university central hospital districts. (STM 2013a: 11-12.) 
 
Private health care sector supplements the public one by selling their services for 
municipalities, joint municipal authorities or directly to end-customers. Private sector 
produces circa one fourth of all health care services in Finland. A major share of these 
services is due to the Finnish occupational health care system. Each employer is 
responsible for providing its employees with occupational health care services, which 
can be bought from either public or private sector. In 2010, the entire health care 
expenses were 16,0 billion euros, which is 8,9 percent of the GNP. Both figures are 
close to the OECD-average. (STM 2013a: 12, 14; TTL 2014.) 
 
The upcoming SOTE-reformation aims at combining social and health services, and 
primary and special health care in order to reduce overlapping services and shortfalls in 
them, and to optimizing resources. Responsibility of producing the services will be on a 
more solid basis. The idea is to divide the country into SOTE-districts, which are 
formed around province capitals of Finland. These joint municipal authorities are 
responsible for organizing all services in their district. Municipals with over 20 000 
inhabitants can choose to form their own primary districts and be responsible for their 
own primary health care services. (STM 2013b; STM 2014.) The reformation has faced 
a lot of criticism. It is now in the point where the government will appoint a team to 
consider the financing of the social and health services (HS 2014). 
 
3.1.2 Municipal decision-making 
 
Finnish municipalities are self-ruled. The municipal council has the highest authority. It 
is elected in the municipal election every fourth year. The council appoints members of 
the municipal board, which is responsible for preparing and executing the council’s 
decisions. The council also appoints different committees that direct the producing of 
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public services. Committees vary according to the municipality but most common are 
education, social and health, and town planning committees. (Suomi.fi 2012.)  
 
The decision-making process is often following: the municipal board appoints 
committees to make different research and reports, which the board then has to approve 
of, before the issue at hand moves forward for the municipal council to decide on. In 
some cities, even the committees can decide whether to move on with a proposal. 
(Helsingin kaupunki 2013; Kunnat.net 2014.) 
 
3.1.3 Act on Public Procurement 
 
The Act on Public Procurement enjoins that governmental and municipal officials have 
to tender their procurements according to it. The purpose of the act is to optimize the 
use of public assets, to promote quality issues in purchasing, and to ensure equal 
opportunities for all companies and organizations to take part in the tendering. In goods 
and service procurement, the act only applies to purchases worth of more than 30 000 
euros. The threshold enjoined by the European Union is 137 000 euros. (Act on Public 
Procurement 30.3.2007/348.) 
 
The act says that buying facets have to organize their operations in the best possible 
way to ensure their economic efficiency. There are several different alternatives for 
tendering methods. Primarily, the tendering should be conducted with either the open or 
restricted method. In the open method, the buyer publishes a public notification, and all 
willing vendors can quote. In the restricted method, vendors reply to the notification and 
the buyer can choose, which vendors are allowed to quote. In many other methods, the 
process is based on a more negotiating policy. (Act on Public Procurement 
30.3.2007/348.) 
 
The act is going to be renewed by 2016 in order to increase the possibilities for direct 
procurement. Also, the current act does not fill the EU criteria. The renewal aims at 
several improvements compared to the current act: simplification of the process, better 
recornition of quality factors, increasing of thersholds, and better possibilities for the 
small and medium-sized companies to participate in tenderings. (TEM 2013.)  
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3.2 IT strategy 
 
The biggest benefits from information technology are gained when IT operations are 
well lead and in align with the company’s overall strategy (Kouhi 2013: 15). IT strategy 
should and cannot be considered a separate topic – neither the strategy itself nor the 
execution of it. IT strategy should be linked to the business strategy of a company but, 
in addition, it is linked to the operative organizing of the IT. (Räty 2006: 6.) 
 
Turban & Volonino (2010: 488) present a model where the business strategy, IS 
strategy and IT strategy are all separate from each other but are aligned and have 
interdependencies. Business strategy determines the direction of the business, IS 
strategy what is required for the business strategy to be implemented, and the IT 
strategy how it can be delivered. Even the Finnish Kouhi (2013: 34-35) divides the 
management of IT into strategic, tactical and operational. 
 
Figure 1. The relationship among business, IS, and IT-strategies according to Ward and 
Peppard 2002 (Turban & Volonino 2010: 488) 
 
The strategic alignment model by Henderson & Venkatraman (1993) is a widely used 
model for presenting the division and interdependencies of strategic and operational 
areas. Horizontally, the model is divided into business and information technology 
functions. Vertically, there are internal and external areas. External IT areas refers to the 
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IT strategy and internal to information systems infrastructure and processes. (Räty 2006: 
6, 13.) 
 
Figure 2. The strategic alignment model by Henderson & Venkatraman 1993 (Räty 
2006: 13) 
 
IT operations should be lead similarly to all other departments. All big decisions, such 
as investments in new facilities and entering a new market, are done in cooperation with 
the company management and the unit management. IT decisions should follow the 
same pattern. There is a Finnish study on how well the company management knows 
what happens in the IT operations – only 11% of the managers claim that they do know 
and an alarming one fifth of the respondents admit that they have no idea what IT 
operations are doing. (Kouhi 2013: 15, 17.) 
 
The IT strategy of Estonia 
 
In year 2006, Estonia created the “Information Society Strategy 2013.” It was created 
since the country had reached a level, where the projects, services, and technologies 
were all interdependent on each other. There was a need for a long-term general plan. 
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The strategy is a framework that sets the objectives for the future. Common and 
coordinated goals and processes are needed to increase the efficiency of ICT in the 
country. (Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2006.)  
 
The strategy is coordinated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and is in line EU-level 
plans. Development of the strategy is based on the Principles of Estonian Information 
Policy that was adopted already in 1998. Its follower for years 2004-2006 was approved 
in 2004, and the Information Society Strategy 2013 came into force in 2007. (Estonian 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications 2006.) 
 
3.3 Information systems procurement  
 
Procuring information systems is a challenging task, due to the complex nature of the 
process. There are technical, juridical, organizational, and psychological factors that 
affect it. Experience plays a big role but many organizations face a situation where they 
start a new information system project without previously acquired knowledge. 
Forselius (2013: 14, 17) divides the procurement of information systems into four parts 
that are procurement preparation, choosing the system and the vendor, monitoring the 
procurement, and finishing it. 
 
Martikainen et al (2012: 108) suggests that procurement processes should be more 
transparent and involve end-users. Forselius (2013: 68-69), too, highlights the 
importance of users being involved in the process. They should be involved in 
determining both the system and quality specifications. Also, careful documentation of 
the entire process is essential for the success of the project.  
 
There are special challenges in public procurement. There are many regulations that 
steer the public procurement and do not necessarily guarantee the most economical 
result. Biggest problems are caused by thresholds and appeal periods. Thresholds cause 
artificial adapting in sizing of the projects – for instance, a big project may be divided 
into smaller ones in order to avoid exceeding the threshold. Or vise versa, if one project 
transgresses the threshold, all kinds of matters is included in the project in order to 
avoid new tendering. Appeal periods may significantly delay public projects. (Forselius 
2013:19-21.) 
 
Information technology is such a major part of business these days that it is 
recommendable that IT management takes part in strategy making and, on the other 
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hand, that general management participates in creating the IT strategy. Often, 
developing the business strategy starts a separate IT strategy process giving it its goals 
and restraints. A part of the IT strategy is the software strategy that determines what sort 
of software is procured. There are differences in the procurement process and the 
outcome, depending on the following type of software. (Forselius 2013: 22, 56-57.) 
 
Off-the shelf software 
Off-the-shelf software procurement focuses on mapping out the supply on the market, 
comparing the products, and then choosing and implementing one system. Off-the-shelf 
software is often relatively inexpensive and quick to implement but requires changes in 
processes. 
Custom software 
When software is tailor-made, the focus is on buying a service and finding the best 
vendor. This type of software requires significantly more resources for requirements 
determination, as well as testing and implementation. If the complex project is managed 
well, custom software has often better usability and possibilities for further development. 
Integrated off- the shelf software 
Much off-the-shelf software needs tailoring. The software may be integrated to existing 
systems, supplemented with more functions or old information be converted to it. This 
way the software will be better suitable for the buying organization. Still, the integration 
may reduce the cost and time benefits that are usually related to off-the-shelf software.  
 
3.3.1 Procurement preparation 
 
Information system procurement should not be started without a clear need that stems 
for the business. The preparations phase of the procurement correlates strongly with the 
success of the entire project. The bigger the procurement is, the more carefully it should 
be planned. A good procurement plan should always produce the following documents: 
system requirements, IT architecture requirements, sizing calculations, and 
requirements for delivery. (Forselius 2013: 25-26.) 
 
A new procurement should always have the support of the management. Without clear 
support, determined steering, and visible monitoring by the management, the benefits of 
the new system often remain only partial. There has to be a clear owner of the project 
for it to succeed. The visibility and presence of the owner motivate the facets and 
persons participating in the project. The owner has to have enough power to make 
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necessary decisions and to, in case needed, take responsibility for failures. (Forselius 
2013: 27-28.) 
 
Specifications 
 
The process of determining system requirements is often the most time-consuming and 
laborious part of the preparation phase. Carefully planned requirements have a clear 
positive impact on the success of the project. They aim at creating an understanding of 
the quality of the new system between the buyer and the vendor. They are also used for 
planning the project budget, schedule, and resources, controlling changes and 
monitoring, and testing and approving the final information system. In case there is a 
lack of knowledge in this area in the organization, external help should definitely be 
obtained somewhere else than from the vendor. (Forselius 2013: 29-30.)   
 
The process of determining system requirements includes following phases that should 
all be carefully executed and documented (Forselius 2013: 30-41): 
 Common level description of the information system 
 User descriptions 
 User stories 
 Explaining the terminology 
 The Entity Relationship Model 
 Business-oriented process descriptions 
 Situations of use 
 System functions  
Later on, more specific requirements, technical planning and testing are performed. 
User stories, process descriptions and situations of use are excellent material to help 
with the testing. 
 
The appropriate level of system requirements is related to pricing. If the intention is to 
purchase a fixed-price system, the requirements have to be perfect. In case the budget is 
not fixed, the pricing can be time-based and requirements completed at a later phase. If 
the budget if limited but flexible, a certain rate can be used that enables one situation of 
use being determined and carried out at a time.  (Forselius 2013: 40.) 
 
Another thing related to the system requirements are quality requirements. Quality 
requirements should always be connected to systems requirements so that they are both 
valid and can be verified. Quality issues should always be considered even if specific 
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system quality requirements increase the price of the project. There are many models 
and standards, such as ISO, for instance, to help with setting the quality requirements. 
(Forselius 2013: 44-45.) 
 
Project sizing & budgeting  
 
Each information system purchase is an investment. The more complex the project is, 
the more difficult it is to calculate the costs and benefits (Forselius 2013: 19). It is not 
reasonable to determine the size of a project just in euros or man-years. Price and results 
do not necessarily correlate with each other, and information system delivery is a branch 
within which it is particularly important to focus on the results. (Forselius 2013: 50-51.)  
 
The Finnish Software Measurement Association has created a model for evaluating the 
workload of software projects. It consists of four different aspects that are the functional 
comprehension of the software, two project-specific factors (circumstances and reuse), 
and the level of return on similar projects. There are also expenses that are not directly 
related to the system, such as training of users. A business case should always include 
investment expenses, future operating costs, and estimated revenues. (Forselius 2013: 
51-51, 54.) 
 
3.3.2 Selection of vendor and solution  
 
If the preparation phase is conducted properly, about half of the work should be done 
when moving to the selection of vendor and solution. The project should be 
approximately halfway time-wise, too. Few people believe that it is actually quite 
simple to develop an information system, if the requirements are well examined and 
documented. Forselius (2013: 71) gives examples on several successful public projects, 
in which the preparation phase has lasted about as long as the operational phase – in one 
project it lasted twice as long.  
 
The purpose of this part of the procurement process is to find a vendor who can execute 
the plans in the best and most efficient way possible. The selection phase consists of 
following actions (2013: 71): 
 Starting the selection process 
 Drawing up an invitation to tender 
 Drawing up an offer (vendor candidates) 
 Comparing offers and drawing up a proposal for decision 
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 Making the decision for procurement 
 Making a contract with the selected vendor 
 Projecting the procurement 
 
Drawing up an invitation to tender should not be difficult if the procurement plan is 
properly made. Specific enough system description and requirements should be found in 
the plan, and they can be attached to the invitation. The invitation itself should be very 
concise and short but it can have even hundreds of pages of attachments (Forselius 
2013: 75.) 
 
The number of offers can often be reduced by adding different requirements for the 
vendor into the invitation. The problem in Finland is that the requirements are often too 
specific, leaving many potential vendors outside the competition. Unreasonable claims 
may speed up the process but result in the best solution remaining out of sight. 
(Forselius 2013: 83.) 
 
Terms of agreement  
 
In addition to the general terms of terms of agreement, such as terms of payment and 
warranty, it is important to agree on the vendor committing to the future development of 
the system and on the ownership of the source code. It is possible to use an escrow-
paragraph, which enjoins the source code to be deposited by a third party. Other terms 
should include conditions for i.a. acceptance and maintaining of the system, copyright 
and ownership issues, and solving controversies (Forselius 2013: 79). 
 
Pricing of the project is one of the most challenging things when making a contract. The 
price should always be agreed on already in the beginning of the project. Especially the 
content of maintenance costs is often unclear for the buyer, and the vendor may try to 
take advantage of it by adding all sorts of modification work into the fee. The contract 
should only cover costs for actual maintenance, and additional work is charged 
separately. (Forselius 2013: 79.) 
 
According to the public opinion, contract pricing is riskier for the vendor and hourly 
pricing riskier for the buyer. Contract pricing requires better specification of system 
requirements. In case the specifications are inadequate, the vendor will have to charge 
more to be on the safe side. If the requirements are completely incomplete, the only 
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option is to use hourly pricing. It is often said that if you pay for hours, you will get 
hours. (Forselius 2013: 50, 80.) 
 
Forselius (2013: 80-81) presents one model that is used in Finland. Such hybrid models 
aim at allocating both the risks and benefits. The estimated work load is priced 
according to contract pricing, and the exceeding work load will be priced according to a 
significantly reduced hourly rate. The hourly rate can even be reduced further step by 
step. There may also be a limit for the maximum chargeable amount. This model can 
also be applied so that the savings for falling below the work load will be divided 
between the buyer’s and vendor’s project teams.  
 
Evaluation criteria and comparison of the contracts 
 
The evaluation and comparison process has four phases: pre qualification, scoring, 
filling out the evaluation chart, and comparison of the best alternatives. Comparing 
offers aims at finding the overall best solution and vendor. The evaluation criteria 
should always be carefully considered and decided on beforehand. Presenting the 
criteria is obligatory in public sector’s invitations to tender, unless the decision is based 
on the price only. (Forselius 2013: 82, 88.) 
 
The evaluation criteria can be divided into two: unconditional and conditional 
requirements. Not fulfilling the first one will lead into immediate rejection of the vendor 
at hand. The evaluation can be targeted at evaluating i.a. the vendor’s organization, its 
solutions and services, project organization, price of the system, terms of agreement, 
availability of maintenance, and warranty. The most used criteria are solutions and 
services, price, and schedule for delivery. Evaluating the vendor’s organization is 
extremely important, since the knowledge of the personnel is one major factor that 
determines the success of the project. (Forselius 2013: 83, 90-91.)  
 
When comparing the costs, it is important to examine them for the entire product life 
cycle, including maintenance and further development. It may be useful to look at the 
ratios of the workload, such as the amount of testing compared to the entire workload. 
This will help when evaluating the overall efficiency of the project. (Forselius 2013: 
89.)  
 
There are many problems that may arise when comparing the offers. First of all, some 
vendor may offer a solution that is based on an entirely new idea. Within the public 
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sector, if this idea is worth to be implemented but does not fill the original criteria, the 
procurement process will have to be started all over again. Sometimes the criteria are 
not set early enough or are not sufficient or relevant. Weighing the criteria is also very 
challenging. (Forselius 2013: 88, 95-96.) 
 
Even though the criteria would be sufficient, sometimes the offers are still not 
comparable. They may lack information or be contradictory. It may even be a tactic for 
vendors to try and hide their weaknesses. They may also try to hide different 
expenditures in order to make the offer look more economical. (Forselius 2013: 96.) 
 
After selecting the finalists, the next step is personal meetings, which are often 
necessary in order to evaluate the vendor’s professionalism, experience and ability to 
co-operate. Checking references is probably the most important way of revising a 
vendor’s ability to deliver a certain solution. Reference clients often answer questions 
very honestly, especially if the vendor’s representatives are not present. Another good 
practice is to meet the future project manager. Instructions for use often reveal a lot 
from the vendor. Test use is the most thorough way to familiarize with the system but it 
is also laborious and expensive. (Forselius 2013: 92.)  
 
Negotiations & proposal for procurement 
 
After selecting the final vendor, the negotiations will be continued to reach an 
agreement of all system specifications and terms of agreement.  The recent trend is that 
information system projects are getting bigger and bigger, so it is naive to expect that 
vendors would not try to take advantage of the situation. The buyer should always get 
suspicious is the vendor does one of the following (Forselius 2013: 92): 
 It appears that the price in does not include all costs. 
 The vendor pressures to make the decision by a certain deadline. 
 The vendor presents two bad solutions. The intention is to make one look so bad 
the other one seems reasonably good. 
 The vendor claims its leeway in pricing to be smaller that it actually is. 
 
All participants will be informed about the final decision and the reasoning behind it. 
Within the public sector, the decisions are public. The execution of the project can start 
after 21 days of the announcement, at the earliest. Before that there is an appeal period, 
during which the decision can be challenged. (Forselius 2013: 98.)  
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3.3.3 Procurement monitoring & finishing of the project 
 
Even if the project got to start as planned, there are still pitfalls ahead. Proper 
monitoring is definitely needed for an information systems project to succeed. It is a lot 
easier to react to a problem immediately when it appears, instead of waiting for it to 
cumulate. Each person working in the project is equally responsible for pointing out 
possible problems. There should be clear models and policies for dealing with the 
problems. (Forselius 2013:101-102.) 
 
Monitoring the progress of an information systems project can be problematic due to 
lack of proper indicators. Actualized workload does not necessarily correlate with the 
completeness of the project. It is important to determine some essential indicators 
before the project starts. Such can be (Forselius 2013: 104): 
 Finished tasks / tasks planned 
 Finished workload / entire workload 
 Time spent / time planned 
 
Project quality can be measured from two different viewpoints: quality of the delivery 
process and quality of the product itself. Process quality is often easier to monitor. 
Poorly specified system requirements make it very difficult to monitor product quality. 
(Forselius 2013: 105.) 
 
After the project is finished, both the buyer and the vendor should take some time to 
evaluate what they succeeded and failed in, so that the procurement process can be 
developed in the future. Their experiences should always be documented in order to 
spread out the knowledge in the organization. The final report of the procurement 
should repeat what was made, how it was made, and how the outcome matched the 
original plans. Also, it is important to collect feedback from different members of the 
project. (Forselius 2013: 106-107.) 
 
The work is not done after the implementation, but the development and fine-tuning of 
both the system and processes continue. (Forselius: 2013: 108.) 
 
3.4 HCIS project special features 
 
There are some special features that need to be considered when dealing with health 
care information system projects. One of the main points of HCIS is that the systems 
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exceed organizational limits, which increases the complexity of the projects. 
Developing a system that meets the requirements of all the end-users, and that will 
hence also be accepted and used, is challenging. Proper evaluation needs is required 
since the failure of HCIS can have more severe effects than the failure of many other 
information systems. 
 
3.4.1 Acceptance of health care information systems 
 
Since the use of information systems is increasing within the field of health care, it is 
important to understand the factors that contribute to the acceptance of the systems 
among the end-users. After that, we are able to determine what sort of a system should 
be designed, what is the best method to design it, and how the system should be 
implemented. Cheng & Hsiao (2012) conducted a survey to study the factors 
influencing the physicians’ acceptance of hospital information systems (HIS). They 
made the following observations:   
“Top management support significantly influences perceived usefulness of HIS”.  
 This support will ensure that there are enough resources available for the project. 
“Project team competency and system quality significantly influence perceived ease of 
use of HIS.” 
 Project team members should have previous experience both in information 
systems adoption and within the field of health care, and have good 
communication skills.  
 System quality consists of such things as system reliability, response and 
security. 
“Perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use influence acceptance of HIS by 
physicians.” 
 Phycians’ positive attitude toward the system makes them more likely to accept 
it. 
 
The following figure was drawn to clarify the dependancy and relations of these results. 
Managers should make sure that the systems introduced to physicians’ have their own 
support, the project team members are qualified for HIS projects, and that the systems 
are usefull and easy to use. Perceived usefulness has a significantly bigger effect on the 
acceptance of the system than what the perceived ease of use does. (Chen & Hsiao 
2012.) 
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Figure 3. Factors affecting the physicians’ acceptance of information systems; based on 
the article of Chen & Hsiao (2012) 
 
The technology acceptance model (TAM) is a well-known and widely used model for 
understanding the factors that affect the acceptance of information systems. Though, it 
is also criticized for being too technologically oriented – human and organizational 
characteristics should be taken into account, too. Human factors are user satisfaction 
and the actual system use, and organizational factors include organizational atmosphere 
and structure. Quality of the system, information, and service make up the technical 
factors.  (Chen & Hsiao 2012: 811.)  
 
Other studies point out the importance and effect of adequate training, the design 
method, user participation in the project and communication between the counterparts. 
All in all, studies show that a well-designed system and a favorable environment will 
have a positive effect on system acceptance, which will further positively affect doctor-
patient relationships, communications, the working environment, and the overall quality 
of care. (Chen & Hsiao 2012: 811-812.) 
 
3.4.2 Preferred type of  HCIS and development 
 
Cross-organizational Health Information Exchange (HIE) has lately been raising more 
interest on both regional, national and European level. The main purpose of HIE 
systems is to give clinicians access to patient data regardless of where the previous 
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treatment has been done, in order to improve efficiency, patient safety and quality of 
care. For instance, comprehensive use of HCIS systems may result in less overlapping 
examinations and duplicate tests. (Hyppönen et al 2013: 2.)  
 
In Finland, the different organizations providing primary and health care services have 
historically had their own patient data systems. Even if tailoring and selecting systems 
thould be localized, a recent study (Hyppönen et al 2013: 2-3) showed that integrated 
systems result in better use and user satisfaction. There were three different types of 
regional HIE-systems in the study:  
 Type 1 Master patient index model 
o Centralized database, users from different organizations have access to 
an index of the original data, data items viewed separately 
 Type 2 Web distribution model 
o Users have access to a web based record with multiple patient data, full 
potential missed since physicians can only see the data of those patients, 
which they have referred 
 Type 3: Regional Virtual EHR model 
o Access to patient records in other institutions, if patient grants access, 
multiple data includinc medication lists 
 
Compared to the users of type 1 master patient index systems and type 2 web 
distribution models, the users of type 3 regional virtual systems were more willing to 
use the electronic EHR system rather than manual means. Also, overall experiences 
were more positive for those who use type 3 integrated systems. (Hyppönen et al 2013: 
2, 13.)  
 
The main concern for physicians is the time-consuming of the patient data exchange 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 98; Hyppönen et al 2013: 2). Even if the data would be 
available, it is not used if the search for it is too time-consuming and laborious. The 
most important aspect for physicians is the availability of data, which is mostly fulfilled 
in local systems but not in regional ones (Hyppönen et al 2013: 11-12). Physicians 
simply hope for information systems that would be reliable and fast. (Martikainen et al. 
2012: 108). Poor performance of information systems reduces the likelihood of their 
implementation being successful (Berg 2001: 143). 
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End-user involvement in HCIS development 
 
A large amount of studies show that end-users should be involved in the development of 
HCIS, especially when the system is an off-the-shelf application. Systems are better 
adopted if end-users are involved in the design process. Also, information systems and 
work processes should be developed hand in hand – simultaneously and in line with 
each other. Currently, users are adjusting their work to fit the HCIS, even if it should be 
vice versa. (Martikainen et al. 2012: 111.)   
 
Martikainen et al. (2012) conducted a study where they asked Finnish physicians about 
their opinions and participation in the development process of the HCIS that they use. 
The responding physicians were very critical when it came to the current systems, and 
also concerning the current methods of their participation in the development of new 
system. They feel that the development is guided by something other than their needs. 
Observation is not used as a method for the developers to obtain knowledge from their 
work but the most common form of user participation is plain user testing. (Martikainen 
et al. 2012; Martikainen et al. 2014.) 
 
Physicians feel that there is a clear lack of user-centeredness in HCIS development. 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 108.) They criticized their own organizations for not involving 
enough clinical physicians in the development work. The systems are designed entirely 
by physicians in administrative positions. (Martikainen et al. 2014: 190.) They also did 
not feel that they can make an impact in the development process, nor did they not 
know how to give feedback concerning the current systems. Physicians thought that 
neither their own organizations’ managers, nor the vendors were interested in their 
feedback. Even if the developers got their feedback, the physicians would never get a 
message to confirm it. (Martikainen et al. 2012: 106-107.)  
 
Later on, Martikainen et al. (2014) asked the developers’ viewpoint on the same issue. 
The sample included all software developers, and customer support and sales personnel 
of one major Finnish HCIS provider. The answers were compared with the physicians’ 
opinions and they were pretty much the opposite. Majority of the developers thought 
that they work with users, are interested in end-user feedback and take their opinions in 
account.  
 
There were significant differences between different EHR system providers 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 108.) but according to the physicians, IT systems providers 
65 
 
also lack the ability to correct possible errors rapidly and according to their wishes. 
Software developers agreed on this issue. What they disagree on was the corrections 
being made according to the end-users wishes. Only 8 percent of the physicians thought 
that this was the case so maybe it is not the end-users who accept the corrections. 
(Martikainen et al. 2014: 197.) 
 
There are many possible reasons for the differences in the two respondent groups’ 
opinions. Even if physicians feel that the vendors are not interested in their opinions, the 
vendors’ employees may still be. Also, developers may work with the customer 
representatives instead of the actual end-users, and there may not be a channel through 
which the developers could answer to the physicians’ feedback. (Martikainen et al. 
2014: 197.) Feedback methods should be developed and the entire development process 
should be more transparent. (Martikainen et al. 2012: 108.) 
 
There is clearly a need to improve the communication between developers and end-user. 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 100, 108.) There is an information failure between the end-
users and representatives, and developers and customer support. This causes the 
information not to move between the developers and end-users. Developers were able to 
point out weaknesses in the development process but neither they nor physicians had 
any actual suggestions for improving the collaboration between the two groups. 
(Martikainen et al. 2014.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Information flow between the different counterparts in an HCIS development 
project; based on the articles of Martikainen et al (2012), and Martikainen et al (2014) 
 
Physicians think that the developers lack knowledge in the field of health care, which is 
confirmed by the fact that the responding developers had very little or no work 
experience in the field of health care. The average respondent worked in the software 
development department and had more than 10 years of experience in IT development 
work, of which 1-5 years was in HCIS. Customer support personnel had more 
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experience in health care, 35 percent more than six years. (Martikainen et al. 2014: 
189.) Physicians suggest that vendors should have physicians who work for them 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 108). 
 
All in all, Finnish clinicians have serious doubts concerning the usefulness and adoption 
of HCIS. On the other hand, they are very willing to participate in the development of 
IT systems. Thus, most of the physician thought that the development should be done 
within the standard working hours. The most preferred method would be to have a close 
contact with the developers in order to discuss and to be able to give direct feedback. 
(Martikainen et al. 2012: 108.)  
 
Software development methods 
 
Different software development methods have recently raised more interest in the field 
of health care. There is a clear need to improve the methods that are used in health care 
information systems development (Martikainen et al. 2012: 111).  In this subchapter, the 
two biggest orientations in software development are presented: Software Development 
Life Cycle models are a more traditional technique for software development, and agile 
methods aim at a more flexible approach and result. 
 
Software Development Life Cycle (SLDC) is a structured project management 
technique. It divides complex tasks into smaller sections so that they are more easily 
manageable. The traditional SLDC method has been criticized for not being relevant 
anymore – one size does not fit all. SLDC should always be tailored according to the 
project at hand. (Ragunath, Velmourougan, Davachelvan, Kayalvizhi & Ravimohan 
2010: 112.) 
 
Typically, a software development project includes the following phases: initiation, 
planning, design, development, testing, implementation, and maintenance. The SLDC 
model describes in which order the phases should be executed. In the General Life 
Cycle Model, phases produce deliverables that are needed for the next phase. In the 
waterfall model, the progress is going downwards like a waterfall. (Ragunath et al 2010: 
112-113.) 
 
The advantages of different SLDC models are that they are simple and easy to use: 
phases are completed one at a time and each phase produces specific deliverables. Some 
of the biggest disadvantages are that no prototypes or software are developed until a 
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very late stage. The model is poor for very complex projects, and adjusting the project 
scope during the project can be impossible (Ragunath et al 2010: 114.) 
 
Agile Manifesto is a statement of values by a group of industry experts, who wanted 
software development to become quicker and more responding to change (Martin 2003: 
4). Their core statement is following: “--- we have come to value individuals and 
interactions over processes and tools, working software over comprehensive 
documentation, customer collaboration over contract negotiation, and responding to 
change over following plan.” (Agile Manifesto 2001.) 
 
First of all, the most important factor for successful projects is people – but bad 
processes can make even the best people useless. Second, there should be a focus on 
human-readable documents instead of huge documents that are very laborious to 
maintain and utilize. Third, there is a big difference between ordering commodities and 
software. The latter cannot be ordered by just writing a description of the software, and 
ordering it with a fixed schedule and price. It is an easy way of ordering software and 
therefore tempting but such attempts keep on failing. In successful projects, developers 
and customers work in close co-operation. (Martin 2003: 5.) 
  
What finally determines the success of a software project is often its ability to respond 
to change. Business environment and customer requirements change causing that the 
software or project cannot be planned very far into the future. The idea of agile software 
development is to evolve the big picture of the software over time, simultaneously as 
the project moves forward. Agile software development can prevent some of common 
errors made in software development. Such errors are: 
 The system being too complex and therefore difficult to change, since on change 
triggers several others 
 The system being impossible to divide into reusable components 
 The system containing infrastructure that has no direct purpose or benefits 
 The system containing repeating structures that could be unified (Martin 2003: 
4-6, 85, 88.) 
 
Human-Computer Interface 
 
There is a clear need for improvements in user interfaces and human-computer 
interaction (Martikainen et al. 2012: 100, 110). A poor user-interface will reduce the 
chances of an information system to be successfully implemented (Berg 2001: 143). A 
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poorly designed interface that is hard to use may result in user resistance (Chen & Hsiao 
2012: 811.) 
 
Jakob Nielsen is a Ph. D. with 79 US patents for easier Internet use. He has established 
a movement and several methods for fast and cheap user interface improvements. He is 
a cofounder of the Nielsen Norman Group (NNG), a company, which does user 
experience research and consulting, and the former VP of research at Apple Computer. 
Nielsen has written numerous books and articles on the topic. (NNG 2014.) Nielsen’s 
main points are following. Usability consists of five elements: learnability, efficiency, 
memorability, errors, and satisfaction. Another key attribute is utility, which refers to 
the functionality of the design. Together, usability and utility determine the usefulness 
of the system. Nielsen suggests that 10 percent of a design project’s budget should be 
spent on usability. (NNG 2012.) 
 
The best way to study usability is user testing. The testing should involve representative 
users, who perform representative tasks with the system. The examiner should observe 
the users without interrupting them, and make notes on what is going smoothly and 
what is causing difficulties. Testing just five users should be enough if you run several 
small tests and make iterative corrections. (NNG 2012.) 
 
3.4.3 HCIS implementation 
 
According to many studies, successful implementation of patient care information 
systems seems to be very difficult in many organizations all over the world. The more 
complex the system is, the harder it is to succeed. Alike the technology acceptance 
model (TAM), the implementation process of PCIS is often considered excessively 
technologically oriented, too (Berg 2001; Chen & Hsiao 2012: 811). Many of the issues 
are actually organizational instead, and social sciences should not be overlooked when 
discussing successful PCIS implementations. (Berg 2001: 143.) Many studies show that 
contextual aspects need to be understood in order to succeed in an HCIS 
implementation (Martikainen et al. 2012: 99). 
 
The success or failure of a system should always be tied to the project at hand. A 
Finnish study shows that the implementation strategy should be flexible and localized 
(Hyppönen et al 2013: 2). Organizational issues play a key role, since they determine 
whether the project is a success for that specific organization. Technical difficulties may 
appear because of poor management. Berg (2001) studied how to determine success and 
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failure listed three myths that prevail when talking about PCIS implementation. He used 
a sociotechnical approach and came up with the following three myths: 
 “PCIS implementation is the technical realization of a planned system in an 
organization.” 
 Implementing a PCIS requires two-way interaction and transformation between 
the technology and the organization. 
“You can leave IS implementation to the IT department.” 
 In order to be successful he implementation process need the support of both 
management and end-users. 
“IS implementation can be planned, including the required organizational redesign.” 
 Being an organizational change process, too, an information system 
implementation has always its uncertainties.   
 
Implementing an information system is a transformation process, where the system 
plays the part of the change agent. Launching of a system will most likely affect the 
work processes, and ways of communication. It may even affect the relationships of 
different groups of staff, since there may be new rules for availability of and access to 
the information, and changes in the processes of entering information to the system. 
PCIS implementations should be seen as processes of organizational development, and 
even used as tools for strategic changes. (Berg 2001: 154.) 
 
An information systems implementation should not be just a technical project that is left 
for the IT department to take care of. There should be people in top-managerial 
positions and from other departments, too, in the project team. End-users should always 
be participated in the implementation of HCIS (Martikainen et al. 2012: 108). The 
importance of end-user involvement cannot be highlighted too much but, still, the 
approach is often limited to only comprehend discussing system specifications and 
implementation plans, instead of the end-user actually getting to use the system in their 
work settings (Berg 2001: 148). 
 
When implementing an information system, the planning and intended control of  the 
process should not be too tight. The system will most likely affect the current work 
processes of the organization but this transformation should not be controlled too much. 
There is always a certain amount of uncertainty related to the implementation process, 
due to the complexity of health care processes and information systems, and the number 
of counterparts involved in the project. (Berg 2001: 150, 154.) 
 
70 
 
3.4.4 Evaluation of health care information system projects 
 
“Evaluation can be defined as the decisive assessment of defined objects, based on a set 
of criteria, to solve a given problem.“ (Ammenwerth et al. 2003: 126.) 
 
Evaluating health care information systems has been proven to be difficult, due to the 
complexity of the field (Ammenwerth et al. 2003: 126). As can be seen in the previous 
subchapters, different factors that have to do with HCIS development and evaluation are 
also closely related to evaluation of health care information systems. Chen & Hsiao 
(2012: 811) suggest that user acceptance is necessary in order to evaluate the success of 
the system. Then again, user acceptance compiles of physicians’ perceived system 
quality and project team competency.  
 
Many studies show that acceptance of a system is directly proportional to the success of 
it, too. System acceptance will further positively affect doctor-patient relationships, 
communications, the working environment, and the overall quality of care (Chen & 
Hsiao 2012: 817). The success of a system can be determined in many ways. Sticking to 
the budget or the schedule may be a success for one organization, while others measure 
savings, wideness of use or reduction of errors in the performance (Berg 2001: 145).  
 
According to Ammenwerth et al (2003: 127), the success of an HCIS project depends 
on following things:  
 Introduction of the technology to the organization 
 Quality of the system 
 Training of end-users 
 Support 
 Motivation of users and 
 The actual use. 
Berg (2001: 145) suggests success factors to be effectiveness, efficiency, worker 
satisfaction, commitment, or patient satisfaction. He highlights that different 
counterparts may have different opinions of the factors. Hyppönen et al (2013: 11) point 
out that even with the same system, there may be regional differences in the success.  
 
Proper evaluation needs to be done since health care information systems are costly and 
their failure can have serious negative effects on patients. Traditional clinical trial 
evaluation methods are not enough, nor basic IT evaluation models. Health care 
information system evaluation has its own unique features that should be taken into 
account – and each system is unique, too. Just like Berg (2001) and Chen & Hsiao 
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(2012) earlier, Ammenwerth et al (2003: 126) highlight the fact that the human players 
in HCIS health care projects need to be considered along the technical aspect. 
Evaluation has to take the organizational environment into account.  
 
According to Ammenwerth et al (2003: 126), evaluation should be made during the 
entire lifecycle of an information system. It  can be of help when deciding on the 
technology, when measuring the system usability, acceptance and patient satisfaction, 
and when studying the cost-effectiveness of the system. Clearly defined models for 
health care information systems evaluation may help to conduct better evaluation. The 
framework should be detailed and support the evaluation during the entire project from 
planning to execution. Different evaluation methods can be used during different phases 
of the project: 
 Systems development phase: technical veridation and validation  
 Implementation and post-implementation phase: pilot and feasibility studies, 
cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies 
 Routine use phase: monitoring 
 
There has been little research done on how the HIE systems actually fulfill the benefits 
that are expected. Rather, the studies have focused on end-user satisfaction (Hyppönen 
et al 2013: 2). Sultan et al (2014) conducted a study on a hospital information system in 
Pakistan. They also studied the financial benefits of the system by measuring the asset 
utilization and return on investment. A quick payback time is also an indicator of low 
risk. Their study also found i.a. the following interconnections between different 
benefits. Some can be hard to assess so qualitative results need to be drawn from factors 
that can be measured quantitatively.   
 
Figure 5. Benefits of implementing a hospital information system; based on the article 
of Sultan et al (2013)  
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Ammenwerth (2003: 127-131) listed three things that make the HCIS evaluation so 
difficult: 
“Complexity of the evaluation object” 
 The evaluation object is not just the hardware and software but the interaction 
between the system, the users and the organizational environment. 
“Complexity of the evaluation project” 
 Health care is a complex environment with many different professional groups 
and many external factors, such as legislation, influencing it.  
“Motivation for evaluation” 
 Proper evaluation can only be conducted if there are enough resources assigned 
by the project management. 
 
To help with evaluation, they suggest the following actions. Possible solutions for the 
first problem could be to define the technology and environment in detail in the 
beginning: software, hardware, the general technical infrastructure, and the number, 
experience, and motivation of users. All changes in these factors should be carefully 
documented. The project could also be divided into smaller modules. Anyway, 
evaluation should always be long-term. The project may have adverse effects, too. 
(Ammenwerth 2003: 127-131.) 
 
In order to avoid difficulties caused by the complexity of the evaluation object, the 
evaluation should be started early enough. It should focus on the most important aspects, 
and not try to measure everything, since it is rarely possible. The evaluation criteria 
should be clear early enough, and additions can then be made if needed and possible. 
Measurement methods should be adequate. Motivation issues can be avoided by 
ensuring that the project management and personnel are motivated. Financial 
compensation can be provided, if necessary.  (Ammenwerth 2003: 127-131.) 
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4 CONCLUSIONS 
When comparing the results with the original hypothesis, which claimed that there must 
be a lack of knowledge in one or several fields of project management, we see that the 
results point to another direction. The main problem is not project management, rather 
than the lack of a coherent strategy and ways of working. Of course, project managerial 
issues play a part in the entity. The further hypothesis, which was made after having 
dealt with the empirical material, was more accurate. A clear and coherent IT strategy 
plays an important role both on national, project and municipal level, and better models 
for monitoring and evaluation of projects, and for project procurement are needed. 
Software development methods should be developed but that alone will not provide a 
solution. End-user participation does not determine the success of an information 
system project but it has a significant indirect effect. 
 
The following, very simplified model was drawn to present the conclusions of this study. 
The main idea is that health care information system projects, alike all other public IT 
projects, are like a three-stage pyramid. A good strategy forms the bottom of the 
pyramid, on top of which comes project procurement. The managing of the project after 
the procurement is actually a relatively small part, if the two foundation parts are in 
order. Evaluation needs to be executed during the entire project in order to succeed in 
projects and to develop IT project management further.  
 
Figure 6. The final model for improving HCIS project management in Finland 
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The basis of everything is a coherent IT strategy both for the state’s overall IT 
operations and for the development of health care information systems. The strategy has 
to include organizing of operations, legislative issues, and decision-making. Estonia’s 
starting point has been better than Finland’s – they do not have a similar existing 
patchwork of systems and such oligopoly of vendors – but they have also contributed to 
their success with a comprehensive information society strategy. 
 
Finland should have a more consistent plan on how to develop both existing and future 
systems. Needs of both the public and the private sector, as well as the needs of both 
special and primary health care have to be taken into account. Also, wishes to include 
social care into health care systems in the future should be considered. The strategy 
should also aim at influencing the prevailing culture, in which all problems are tried to 
be solved at once and aborting of unsuccessful projects in time is not considered an 
option. A culture that values IT projects and enhances their importance will most likely 
result in better interest in and, finally, knowledge of IT project management. Improved 
knowledge will improve decision-making.  
 
Project procurement can be divided into four parts: procurement preparation, choosing 
the system and the vendor, monitoring the procurement, and finishing it (Forselius 
2013: 14, 17). By having good knowledge in project procurement, public buyers will be 
able to divide projects into smaller parts and to reduce their dependency on the vendors. 
The culture should be more cooperative rather than confronting, and end-users should 
be involved in the project as of the procurement. A cooperative and interactive 
operations model will allow the organizations to use and benefit from more agile 
software development methods, and involving the end-users will automatically lead to a 
better Human Computer Interface. The entire procurement process should be more 
transparent for all counterparts. 
 
Procurement preparation is by far the most important part – it can and should make for 
up to half of the time and work load of the entire project. The system specifications that 
are created during this phase should be done carefully, since they will be used for 
pricing, budgeting, scheduling, resource planning, change control, and monitoring of 
quality. When selecting the vendor and solution, the focus should be on the terms of 
agreement: future development and maintenance of the system, ownership of the source 
code, and criteria for approval. The buying organization should be aware of certain 
pitfalls during the negotiations. Evaluation criteria must be clear from the very 
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beginning and include the entire life cycle of the project. The invitation to tender should 
not have too specific requirements for the vendors.  
 
One key issue in the management of a HCIS project is that the project has top 
management support and a clear owner, who takes responsibility for the project. For 
instance, the new leader of the Apotti project, Hannu Välimäki, has been speaking in 
favor of the project in the public, and taken a clear role as the front man of the project. 
The role should be clear within the project, too. Management should be transparent and 
it is extremely important to continue with the end-user involvement through the entire 
project. Communications between buying organizations and vendors should be 
improved; above all, the flow of information and feedback between developers and end-
users should be enhanced. Communications is, in principle, easier in smaller 
organizations, so allowing smaller vendors to tender for and to execute development 
projects could have a positive impact on communications. 
 
Implementing an information system is not just a technical project but also a 
simultaneous development of both systems and work processes. Project management 
should emphasize the role of human factors during the entire project, and especially 
during the implementation phase. The execution should not be left for just the IT 
department. The implementation strategy should be flexible and localized, since it is an 
organizational change process and the plans are very likely to change during the 
implementation.  
 
Proper evaluation of HCIS projects needs to be done in order to control the cost-
effectiveness of the projects but, above all, to ensure patient safety. Traditional clinical 
trial or IT evaluation models are not enough – human players need to be considered, 
once again. The success of a system can be determined in many organization and 
project related ways but one common factor is that the evaluation framework should 
cover the entire lifecycle of the project, and be determined before-hand. It is important 
not to try to measure everything but to focus on the most important factors, and to be 
able to transform qualitative results into quantitatively measurable factors.   
 
What determines the final success of an information system project is whether the 
system will actually be used, and the effective usage of HCIS strongly correlates with 
the end-users’ acceptance of the system. Acceptance is influenced by perceived 
usefulness and ease of use. Both factors can be affected by careful execution of the 
procurement phase, continuous interaction between all project members and by 
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providing adequate training both before and after the system is implemented. The 
Ministry of Finance has a program for developing the evaluation of information system 
projects but it only concerns state-owned projects (Ministry of Finance 2010). There is a 
clear need for common evaluation models for regional and municipal projects, too. By 
benchmarking to previous similar and successful projects, many organizations and 
municipalities could compensate their lack of knowledge in information system projects.  
 
All in all, the situation in Finland is not hopeless. There are many positive examples of 
successful information system projects, even within the health care sector, and 
awareness of the matter is rising. Resources and knowledge are just a matter of will: 
Finland is already cooperating with Estonia in several projects and their expertise is 
available for further utilization, too. The coming changes in the Act on Public 
Procurement put more emphasis on qualitative issues and will allow more flexible 
tendering by improving the position of small and medium sized companies in the 
process (Kuntalehti 2014). The brand new SOTE-reformation divides the country into 
five SOTE-regions that are responsible for organizing all health services in their district 
(HS 25.3.2014). The reformation will hopefully lead into more uniform development of 
health care information systems – at least within the districts. The coherent development 
of the different districts should be ensured. 
 
The role of media is important when transmitting information on tax-financed health 
care information system projects but reporters should not indulge in exaggeration – and 
definitely not in providing false information as sometimes happens. The situation in 
Finland is not even close to good but one thing is for sure: by focusing solely on the 
negative issues, the improvements will remain limited. As said, the situation is not 
hopeless, since we have positive examples, too. Such successful projects should be used 
for benchmarking, in order to spread knowledge. A coherent and comprehensive IT and 
HCIS strategy is needed, and monitoring and evaluation play a key role in implementing 
it. When the legislation is in order, it is just a matter of cooperation – cooperation 
between the buyer and the vendor, between different buying organizations, and within 
the buying organizations so that the end-users opinions will be heard.    
 
4.1 Recommendations 
 
Putting up the state’s new IT unit gives an excellent opportunity for concrete 
improvement actions. Finland should examine the operations of other countries, such as 
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Estonia and Denmark, and utilize their experience and knowledge. The operations of the 
new unit should include the following fields: 
- Creating a strategy 
- Enabling related research 
- Setting up a technical framework 
- Building operations and evaluation models 
- Enhancing cooperation with vendors 
- Consulting and training 
- Evaluating and monitoring 
 
First step would be to create a common strategy and to communicate it to all public 
facets. The strategy should be created together with municipal counterparts and public 
organizations so that it would not be just a top-down set of recommendations. It should 
include a good communications plan, in order to improve the prevailing culture and to 
highlight the importance of health care information systems and IT project management. 
The strategy should also include a long-term plan for research so that the current results 
of research made by, for instance, the Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) and 
different universities could be utilized in its full potential.   
 
The new unit should create a technical framework, in order to ensure the uniform 
development of public information systems. As mentioned earlier, Denmark has an 
organization called MedCom, which is responsible for standardizing information 
between municipalities, IT vendors and the state. The unit should study current 
operations models in different municipalities and public organizations – and why not 
private health care organizations, too – so that it could provide concrete information 
about best practices when executing and evaluating health care information system 
projects.  
 
The unit should also enhance cooperation with vendors, and serve municipalities and 
organizations by offering relevant consulting and training. Improving the knowledge in 
project procurement is especially important. Above all, the evaluation and monitoring of 
information system projects should be done more carefully. Even if the National Audit 
Office would execute it, the process should follow guidelines that are based on the 
state’s IT strategy. The monitoring and evaluation process should be transparent itself 
but also improve the transparency of the projects in general. 
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Finland has definitely got the technical skills that are needed to stay at the top of the list 
when considering the leading IT countries in the world. It is the management practices 
that need to be brought to this century. The current situation could be compared to a 
company that lacks a coherent strategy, and the units of which therefore work totally 
separately from each other. The new IT unit should cover the roles of the executive 
committee, administration and support functions but still value bottom-up ideas and 
operations models, so that best practices could be utilized. Some of our top business 
leaders could be consulted, in order to adopt more flexible and business-like operations 
models.   
 
4.2 Scope for further study 
 
In my opinion, future research should focus more on success, rather than on failures. By 
studying failed projects, you will only learn what not to do. There should be more 
examples of successful projects, in order to be able to create standardized ways of 
working. Health care information systems are a very specific field of study but they 
should also be studied in a larger context. A lot could be learned from determining 
common factors behind the leading IT countries and successful health care information 
systems projects, and by comparing best practices between different countries. Also, 
public information system projects should not be considered totally separate from 
private ones. Above all, the research should be very practice-related and, as already 
mentioned, make suggestions for improvements instead of just pointing out failures. 
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Appendix 1: List of news articles used in the Thesis 
Helsingin Sanomat 15.5.2012. Resepti tulee, arkisto takeltelee.  
Helsingin Sanomat 8.7.2012. Konsulttiyhtiö Accenturen kaksoisrooli ihmetyttää. 
Helsingin Sanomat 16.7.2012a. Päätetyö ahdistaa lääkäreitä. 
Helsingin Sanomat 16.7.2012b. Toimimattomat ohjelmat syövät työtehoa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 9.9.2012. Sähköiset reseptit käyttöön Espoossa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 10.9.2012. Näkökulma: Potilastietojärjestelmän posketon hinta 
kuohuttaa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 11.9.2012. Kymmenet mielenosoittajat protestoivat 
potilastietojärjestelmän kustannuksia. 
Helsingin Sanomat 17.9.2012. Sitra houkutteli Viron potilastietojärjestelmän 
pääarkkitehdin Suomeen. 
Helsingin Sanomat 22.9.2012a. STM: Kunnat vastaavat itse järjestelmistään. 
Helsingin Sanomat 22.9.2012b. Valtio perustaa oman it-yhtiön. 
Helsingin Sanomat 24.9.2012. Kivijalka jäi rakentamatta.  
Helsingin Sanomat 1.10.2012. Professori: Ministeriö ei kerro terveysarkiston oikeita 
kuluja.  
Helsingin Sanomat 2.10.2012. Apotti-hankkeelle lyötiin jarrua Helsingin 
lautakunnissa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 14.10.2012. Hankintalakia käytetään usein väärin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 21.10.2012. Sähköinen resepti käytössä puolessa 
terveyskeskuksista ja sairaaloista.  
Helsingin Sanomat 1.11.2012. Verkkoapteekista saa nyt myös reseptilääkkeitä.  
Helsingin Sanomat 13.11.2012. Kiistelty Apotti-hanke nytkähti eteenpäin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 12.12.2012. Helsinki hyväksyi Apotin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 21.1.2013. Espoo sanoo ei yhteiselle potilastietojärjestelmälle. 
Helsingin Sanomat 23.1.2013. Espoolla oli järkisyyt Apotin hylkäämiseen. 
Helsingin Sanomat 24.1.2013. Espoo korostaa itsenäisyyttään.  
Helsingin Sanomat 28.1.2013. Espoon valtuusto aloitti kautensa hylkäämällä Apotin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 3.2.2013. Tanska on yksinäinen onnistuja.  
Helsingin Sanomat 26.3.2013. Julkiset it-hankkeet epäonnistuvat usein.  
Helsingin Sanomat 29.3.2013. Potilaat saavat piilottaa tietojaan lääkäreiltä uudessa 
arkistossa.  
Helsingin Sanomat 24.4.2013. Helsinki sitoutuu Apottiin Espoosta huolimatta. 
Helsingin Sanomat 21.5.2013. Puolen miljardin Apotti-hanke sai uuden vetäjän. 
Helsingin Sanomat 22.5.2013. Apotti-hankkeen uusi isäntä lupaa välttää karikot. 
Helsingin Sanomat 29.5.2013. Sähköiset palvelut vievät paljon rahaa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 4.6.2103. Hus hyväksyi Apotin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 17.6.2013. Vantaa sitoutuu potilastietojärjestelmä Apottiin. 
Helsingin Sanomat 10.8.2013. Terveysarkiston käyttöönotto saattaa taas lykkääntyä.  
Helsingin Sanomat 21.8.2013a. Krp alkaa tutkia sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön toimia 
potilastietojärjestelmissä. 
Helsingin Sanomat 21.8.2013b. Kerava horjuttaa Apottia jäämällä sen ulkopuolelle. 
Helsingin Sanomat 26.8.2013. Apotti-järjestelmä tulee kaikkien kukkarolle. 
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Helsingin Sanomat 7.9.2013. IT-järjestelmän tilaaminen on taitolaji.  
Helsingin Sanomat 10.9.2013. Yle: Paperireseptit poistumassa lakimuutoksella.  
Helsingin Sanomat 17.9.2013. Viro auttaa Suomea valtavan uuden verkkorekisterin 
luomisessa. 
Helsingin Sanomat 19.9.2013. Professori: Perusterveydenhuollon romahtamisen 
syynä keikkalääkärit ja tietojärjestelmät.  
Helsingin Sanomat 21.10.2013. E-resepti tulee kalliiksi pienille lääkäriyrityksille.  
Helsingin Sanomat 4.11.2013. Apotilla on nyt näytön paikka. 
Helsingin Sanomat 29.11.2013a. Virolaiset ohittavat byrokratian asioimalla 
internetissä. 
Helsingin Sanomat 29.11.2013b. Näin samat palvelut toimivat Suomessa.  
Helsingin Sanomat 29.11.2013c. Poliisi lopetti esitutkinnan potilastietohankkeen 
valvonnan laiminlyönneistä.  
Helsingin Sanomat 5.12.2013. Viro ehdottaa Suomelle sähköistä koulutusyhteistyötä. 
Helsingin Sanomat 10.2.2014. Länsi-Metro viivästyy lisää.  
Helsingin Sanomat 25.3.2014. Husin toimitusjohtaja Aki Lindén: Tämä kaavio 
ratkaisi sote-uudistuksen mallin. 
Lääkärilehti 10.8.2012. Uutta it-ajattelua Virosta? 
Talouselämä 15.12.2008. Sähköisen tunnistuksen sotku pahenee.  
Talouselämä 9.10.2009. Digipalvelut vaativat yhteistyötä. 
Talouselämä 1.11.2009. Kansallinen terveysarkisto myöhästyy.  
Talouselämä 4.2.2011. 21 vuotta kestänyt it-projekti ei ole vieläkään valmis – syynä 
kiire. 
Talouselämä 26.9.2011. Tieto: Lääkärit eivät osanneet käyttää eReseptejä. 
Talouselämä 2.10.2011. Suomella on pitkä it-mokahistoria. 
Talouselämä 14.8.2012. Suomi käytti terveydenhuollon it-projektiin jopa 50 kertaa 
enemmän kuin Viro. 
Talouselämä 28.1.2013. Espoolta lopullinen niitti Apotti-suunnitelmille. 
Talouselämä 30.1.2013. Apotti on liian suuri riski. 
Talouselämä 5.3.2013. It-murheenkryyni etsii uutta johtajaa. 
Talouselämä 27.3.2013. Nämä 33 hakevat johtamaan Suomen jättimäistä it-hanketta. 
Talouselämä 22.5.2013. Apotti-ohjelman johtaja vakuuttaa, että tällä kertaa kaikki 
onnistuu. 
Talouselämä 20.8.2013. Nyt myös Kerava hylkäsi Apotti-hankkeen – KU: Saattaa 
liittyä 2020. 
Talouselämä 23.10.2013. Käsittämätön määrä lääkkeitä: Suomessa kirjoitetaan 
pelkkiä sähköisiä reseptejä lähes 10 000 päivässä.  
Talouselämä 7.11.2013. Taas alueellistetaan: Valtion jättimäinen it-keskus 
perustetaan muualle kuin pääkaupunkiseudulle.  
YLE 8.10.2009. Sähköinen potilasasiointi karahti kiville. 
YLE 10.11.2009. Risikko: Sähköisen potilasasioinnin siirtymäaikaa muutetaan. 
YLE 5.4.2011. Kotka siirtyi e-resepteihin.  
YLE 23.9.2011. Sähköisten reseptien käyttökieltoa laajennettiin. 
YLE 24.9.2011. Lääkärit tarkistelevat sähköisiä reseptejä viikonlopun yli.  
YLE 26.9.2011. Kotka luopuu eReseptistä toistaiseksi.  
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YLE 28.9.2011. Sähköinen resepti –hanke tuli Kotkalle kalliiksi. 
YLE 6.10.2011. Sähköinen resepti otetaan takaisin käyttöön. 
YLE 10.1.2012a. Selvitys: Valtio tuhlannut miljoonia terveydenhuollon IT-
hankkeissa. 
YLE 10.1.2012b. STM ja Tekes tyrmäävät kritiikin IT-hankkeista.  
YLE 14.5.2012. Sähköisessä reseptissä paljastunut vakavia turvallisuusriskejä.  
YLE 7.6.2012. Sähköisten reseptien uusiminen kangertelee.  
YLE 12.9.2012. Arvosteluryöppy yllätti potilastietojärjestelmän valmistelijat. 
YLE 14.9.2012. Potilastietojärjestelmän valmistelijat: Hinta korostuu keskustelussa 
liikaa. 
YLE 17.9.2012. Sitra värväsi potilastietojärjestelmän rakentamisesta vastanneen 
asiantuntijan Virosta Suomeen. 
YLE 20.9.2012. It-hankkeista jo “riittävästi itseruoskintaa”. 
YLE 19.11.2012. Apotti-järjestelmän tietoturva epäilyttää ammattilaisia. 
YLE 11.12.2012. Sähköinen potilastietojärjestelmä on turva ja uhka.  
YLE 13.12.2012. HUSin uusi potilastietojärjestelmä myötätuulessa. 
YLE 21.1.2013. Apotti-potilastietojärjestelmä ei kelpaa Espoolle. 
YLE 24.1.2013a. Ylilääkäri: Espoon Apotti-päätös voi vaarantaa 
potilasturvallisuuden. 
YLE 24.1.2013b. Espoo ei jätä naapureita pulaan vetäytyessään Apotista. 
YLE 28.1.2013. Espoon valtuusto hylkäsi Apotti-järjestelmän. 
YLE 4.2.2013. Hankintalaki uudistuu, nykyistä tulkitaan miten sattuu. 
YLE 13.2.2013. Apotti-hankkeelle uusi johtaja.  
YLE 28.2.2013. Apotista uudet päätökset kesäksi. 
YLE 2.4.2013. E-reseptien käytössä suuria alueellisia eroja.  
YLE 5.4.2013. E-reseptin suunnitteluvirheen korjaaminen on hidasta ja kallista.  
YLE 7.5.2013. IT-asiantuntija: Husin uusi potilastietojärjestelmä menossa pahasti 
pieleen. 
YLE 8.5.2013. Apotti-järjestelmä kehittyy vuorovaikutuksessa. 
YLE 29.5.2013. Kauniainen haluaa edelleen mukaan Apottiin. 
YLE 7.6.2013 Sähköisten reseptien uusiminen kangertelee.  
YLE 5.11.2013. Potilastietojärjestelmän kilpailutus etenee. 
 
